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RICHARD C. REUBEN* 
Abstract: Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and related state laws are among the 
most important rules to implement the national policy favoring the settlement of 
legal disputes. These rules bar the introduction of statements made during nego-
tiations leading to the resolution of legal disputes. However, comprehensive 
analysis of the rule’s text, doctrinal history, and modern context demonstrates 
that the rule no longer meets its noble goals. Rather, the rule has evolved textu-
ally from a remarkably narrow and complex categorical presumption of inad-
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missibility with limited exceptions to a simpler rule that gives courts considera-
ble deference to admit such evidence when they deem it appropriate. Doctrinal-
ly, both federal and state courts have interpreted its limitations narrowly and its 
exceptions broadly as they have sought to do justice in particular cases. These 
statutory and doctrinal problems are exacerbated by the changing nature of legal 
negotiations. When Rule 408 was enacted in 1975, the dominant model of legal 
negotiation was positional and adversarial bargaining, in which lawyers guarded 
information closely, and settlement largely focused on the economic value of 
the dispute. Today, however, the emerging norm of legal negotiation is more in-
terest-based problem-solving, in which lawyers are encouraged to disclose their 
clients’ needs, concerns, preferences, and other sensitive information. Though 
helpful in problem-solving, this information might also be detrimental to the cli-
ent in subsequent proceedings if the negotiation fails. The result is a perfect 
storm that threatens to undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of modern legal 
negotiation as more lawyers become aware of the limitations of Rule 408 and 
more courts expand upon the permissive doctrinal foundation now in place. 
Such a result not only defies Congress’s clear and unambiguous intent to pro-
mote settlement when it enacted Rule 408, but it is also unacceptable given the 
American legal system’s need for the private settlement of cases as a matter of 
institutional efficiency, as well as the capacity of settlement to produce better 
outcomes for the parties. This situation needs to be fixed, and this Article details 
both the contours of the problem and proposes that it may be remedied by ele-
vating Rule 408 from its current status as a “quasi-privilege” to a full and formal 
privilege at the federal level and then passing conforming legislation in the 
states. 
INTRODUCTION 
Every day, the nation’s more than 1.3 million lawyers engage in count-
less legal negotiations as part of the litigation process.1 A lawyer in New York 
negotiates with a bank in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy by his client.2 A 
lawyer in California mails a letter on behalf of his client offering to settle the 
plaintiff union’s claims.3 A lawyer in Oklahoma tries to settle a personal inju-
ry claim.4 Although the lawyers in each of these actual cases are almost sure-
ly strategic about what they disclosed in their negotiations, it is reasonable to 
presume they also feel they could engage in the negotiations with some de-
gree of candor—or, at least, without worry about statements made in the ne-
gotiation being introduced later in court if the negotiation failed. This is the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, AM. BAR ASS’N (2017), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/Total%20National%20Lawyer%20Population
%201878-2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/F46Z-FHMQ]. 
 2 E.g., In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 691–92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 3 See Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union Local No. 162 v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc., 86 
Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1970). 
 4 Archer v. Kelly, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322–23 (N.D. Okla. 2003). 
2018] Confidentiality in Legal Negotiations Under Rule 408 527 
promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 4085 (“Rule 408”) and similar state 
rules that have been adopted to some extent in all fifty states.6 Yet, in each of 
these three cases, the evidence from the legal negotiation was admitted over a 
Rule 408 objection.7 There are many more examples. 
This outcome may seem counterintuitive because the practical logic of 
the rule—that parties will not disclose the information necessary to settle if 
they believe that what they say can be used against them later in court if the 
negotiation fails—creates a widely held assumption that legal negotiations are 
“confidential,” and that “what’s said in this room stays in this room.”8 
Unfortunately, like many hardened beliefs, this assumption is simply 
wrong—or perhaps more accurately, it is greatly overstated. Rather, a rigor-
ous analysis of Rule 408 and related state laws9 reveals that Rule 408’s facade 
obscures a complex thicket of statutory constraints, judicially created limita-
tions and exceptions, and other traps for the unwary10 that are available to 
circumvent restrictions by litigants who push hard against the rule’s thin ve-
neer. 
Revisions to the federal rule have only made matters worse, shifting its 
language from a rule of presumptive inadmissibility with limited exceptions 
to one of presumptive admissibility with limitations. Because the majority of 
state laws are based on the original 1976 version of Rule 408, rather than the 
2011 amended version,11 there is now a great disparity of coverage between 
the federal law and the state laws that purport to mirror it, as well as signifi-
cant coverage variations among states.12 
Finally, even as modified in 2011, Rule 408 no longer squares with 
modern legal negotiations, which emphasize the disclosure of party interests, 
needs, preferences, and concerns over mere bargaining positions—the very 
kind of information that would be most damaging to a client if the negotiation 
fails. 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 6 See infra notes 139–150 and accompanying text. 
 7 Archer, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1322–23; Portnoy, 201 B.R. at 691–92; Moving Picture, 86 Cal. 
Rptr. at 36, 39; see also infra notes 151–258 and accompanying text. 
 8 Cf. Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 
2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 99, 110–11 [hereinafter Reuben, Dust Settling] (discussing current mediator 
disclosure practices). 
 9 The rule is often called the “offers of compromise” rule. See infra notes 22–64 and accom-
panying text. 
 10 See Robert A. Weninger, Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Trapping the Unwary, 
26 REV. LITIG. 401, 408 (2007) (“Except for statements made by the unrepresented or unwary, the 
amendment may fail to accomplish its objective of providing evidence to the government to aid in 
the prosecution of crime.”). 
 11 See infra notes 128, 137 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 139–258 and accompanying text. 
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Descriptively and prescriptively, the confidentiality doctrine for legal 
negotiations is a disaster that must be fixed. Despite some academic con-
cerns,13 settlement is a crucial part of the American system of justice.14 Both 
civil and criminal courts in the state and federal spheres have chronically 
heavy caseloads,15 and without negotiated settlements the tide of legal cases 
would surely overwhelm the system, paralyzing case flow and leading to in-
terminable delay, costs, and uncertainty for litigating parties. It would also 
deny parties the autonomy to resolve their legal disputes according to their 
own preferences rather than the imposition of external rules—that is to say, 
by private ordering rather than public ordering.16 If institutionalized, such 
gridlock could give rise to the kind of corruption commonly seen in less de-
veloped countries with less efficient judicial systems, thus undermining the 
rule of law itself.17 
This is a systemic problem that needs to be recognized and addressed, 
and this Article hopes to begin that discussion. Part I details the history of 
Rule 408, as well as its codification and amendments in the federal sphere.18 
It also discusses how the states have enacted at least theoretically conforming 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that set-
tlement is not necessarily “preferable to judgment” and “should be treated . . . as a highly prob-
lematic technique for streamlining dockets”); see also Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the 
Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1986) (“[A]rguing that the current cam-
paign to obtain a blanket mediation privilege rests on faulty logic, inadequate data, and short-
sighted professional self-interest.”); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: 
Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 1, 7–10 (1993) (detailing the many critical perspectives of the alternative reform move-
ment). 
 14 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation 
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (1994) (“As the legal system has grown, the settle-
ment component has increased in prominence while the portion of cases that run the whole course 
to trial has shrunk.”). 
 15 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (noting the 
“already overburdened system”); Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 2170, 2178 (2010) (noting the “perception of a ‘litigation explosion’”); see also Adam M. 
Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Case-
loads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 262 (2011) (describing overworked 
prosecutors and public defenders). 
 16 See Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, 
Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 272 (2007) [hereinafter Reuben, Process Purity] (“[T]he 
displacement of finality with substantive judicial review, if codified, will greatly undermine the 
arbitration process . . . .”). See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Ne-
gotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 680–81 (1976) (discussing 
the benefits and disadvantages of different methods of negotiation). 
 17 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and 
Legal Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO 
THE RULE OF LAW 96, 126 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (discussing the chal-
lenges facing India’s legal system and unsuccessful attempts to restore a more effective rule of 
law). 
 18 See infra notes 22–150 and accompanying text. 
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legislation. Part II describes how and why federal and state courts have un-
dermined the general rule, interpreting the general rule of inadmissibility nar-
rowly, applying the exceptions broadly, and creating a broad range of excep-
tions and limitations of their own to further weaken the rule.19 It is based on 
an analysis of all federal and state appellate cases reported through January 1, 
2017, in which a Rule 408 claim was rejected, in order to identify trends, 
common exceptions, and other considerations courts actually use in deciding 
these cases. 
Part III then contextualizes the problem in light of the evolution of legal 
negotiation—from traditional positional bargaining before the enactment of 
Rule 408 to today’s more principled style of interest-based negotiation.20 In 
so doing, it demonstrates how the model of legal negotiation for which Rule 
408 was designed is fundamentally inconsistent with modern legal negotia-
tion practice, which encourages disclosure as it promotes settlement and pri-
vate ordering rather than public ordering. 
Finally, Part IV argues that Rule 408 must be redrafted as a full privilege 
to remedy the problems previously identified, to realign Rule 408 with con-
gressional intent, and to return Rule 408 to its noble historical goals in light of 
legal and judicial practice today.21 
I. THE HISTORY AND TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL RULE 408 
Legal protections for the confidentiality of settlement discussions have 
been a fixture of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries. This Part traces 
that history, as well as its modern codification in the federal and state systems 
in the United States. 
A. Preliminary Matters 
1. Clarifying Compromise 
By its terms and title, “Compromise and Offers to Compromise,” Rule 
408 and related state laws apply only to “compromise” discussions and not to 
other aspects or types of legal negotiations. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a 
compromise as “[a]n agreement between two or more persons to settle mat-
ters in dispute between them; an agreement for the settlement of a real or 
supposed claim in which each party surrenders something in concession to 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 151–258 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 260–302 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 305–364 and accompanying text. 
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the other.”22 As this Article shows, the courts have defined compromise in 
terms of the surrender of economic value by the parties.23 
Although a compromise discussion seems similar to a settlement discus-
sion, they are not the same. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a settlement as 
“[a]n agreement ending a dispute or lawsuit”—which, on its face, is consider-
ably broader than compromise.24 It potentially encompasses any number of 
possible outcomes, whereas compromise discussions are limited to discus-
sions about the exchange of value.25 
Legal negotiation is an even broader term. Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines it as “[a] consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to 
reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter.”26 This defini-
tion, though helpful, appears narrower than it actually is because of its use of 
the term “dispute.” Many legal negotiations, such as transactional negotia-
tions, involve conflict in the sense that the parties may have competing inter-
ests,27 but that conflict often does not rise to the level of a formal dispute, 
much less one that has been legalized through the hiring of lawyers or the 
filing of a lawsuit.28 The conflict simply needs to be worked through to rec-
oncile the competing interests of the parties. 
Compromise discussions, settlement discussions, and legal negotiations 
are similar in that they are integrative processes in which both parties try to 
reach an outcome that at least minimally satisfies, or integrates, both of the 
parties’ interests.29 Compromise and settlement discussions can, and often do, 
occur during the course of legal negotiations, particularly those relating to 
more complex problems involving multiple parties and multiple issues. 
These processes differ fundamentally, however, in the scope of interests 
subject to integration. With compromise, the scope is narrowly focused on the 
identification of a number that represents economic value.30 Settlement dis-
cussions are broader in that they also include non-economic interests affect-
ing the dispute that are subject to negotiation and agreement, including, for 
example, the relationship between the parties.31 Legal negotiations are even 
broader because they can include all issues, even ones not closely tethered to 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Compromise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 23 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 24 Settlement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22. 
 25 Compare id., with Compromise, supra note 22. 
 26 Negotiation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22. 
 27 A leading treatise on conflict defines conflict as “perceived divergence of interest, a belief 
that the parties’ current aspirations are incompatible.” DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL 
CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 7–8 (3d ed. 2004). 
 28 For a discussion of the important distinction between conflict and disputes, see LEONARD 
L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 10–11 (2d ed. 1997). 
 29 See DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 97, 314, 392 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999). 
 30 See id. at 97. 
 31 See id. at 392. 
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a particular dispute,32 such as a business interest shared by the parties but 
which is not subject to the dispute at hand. 
As legal negotiation practice has evolved, so have other ways to achieve 
an integrative solution besides compromise, such as value creation (or “ex-
pand[ing] the pie”),33 nonspecific compensation,34 logrolling,35 and even 
yielding.36 
Rule 408 and its state progeny apply only to compromise discussions—
however, that is a relatively small slice of the now robust process of legal ne-
gotiation.37 As a result, rules of privilege and professional ethics provide the 
only protections against the admissibility of communications arising from 
these other parts of the negotiation process—by far the most significant por-
tion of the legal negotiation process.38 
Those protections, however, are quite limited. For example, Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.6, governing the attorney’s duty of confidentiality, 
has many exceptions, including “compl[iance] with other law[s] or . . . court 
order[s].”39 Similarly, the attorney-client privilege only applies to communi-
cations between the attorney and client, not communications between oppos-
ing counsel.40 It is the limited scope of these ethics and privilege rules that 
give rise, in part, to the need for Rule 408 and related state laws. 
2. The Meaning of Confidentiality 
Just as the concept of legal negotiation is layered and nuanced, so too is 
the concept of confidentiality. 
As in other areas of dispute resolution, confidentiality must be under-
stood to include two component parts, each of which is typically treated dif-
ferently by the law: the “privacy” of the compromise discussion, and the 
“admissibility” of evidence disclosed within the compromise discussion.41 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. at 314. 
 33 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN 
DEALS AND DISPUTES 12–13 (2000); PRUITT & KIM, supra note 27, at 194. 
 34 PRUITT & KIM, supra note 27, at 195. 
 35 Id. at 196. 
 36 Id. at 38–39. 
 37 See infra notes 260–285 and accompanying text. 
 38 See Russell Korobkin et al., The Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 839, 843–45 
(2004) (discussing how abiding by professional codes of conduct, such as privilege and ethical 
obligations, can constrain conduct during negotiations). 
 39 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
 40 FED. R. EVID. 501–502. 
 41 See Richard C. Reuben et al., Ombuds, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY PRACTICE: 2003–2004, at 383, 392–93 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
Reuben, Ombuds] (summarizing new ABA ombuds standards); Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiali-
ty in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2006) [hereinafter Reuben, 
Confidentiality] (explaining the difference “between the ‘privacy’ of the arbitra[tion] proceeding 
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The “privacy” of a legal negotiation refers to the ability of uninvited 
third parties—such as business partners, former spouses, and the media—to 
access and observe the negotiation without the consent of the disputing par-
ties.42 Privacy also refers to the ability of the disputing parties, the arbitrator, 
witnesses, and others who attended the settlement discussion to disclose pub-
licly statements made in the proceeding, documents tendered in the proceed-
ing, or observations of conduct by parties, witnesses, and other participants 
during the course of the proceeding.43 These kinds of third-party disclosures 
include a wide range of possibilities—from disclosures to spouses, family 
members and friends, to business partners and competitors, and students in 
classrooms and training sessions. Because these disclosures are in the private 
realm, the law historically has expected parties to regulate them through the 
law of contract, and that law is generally well developed and broadly accept-
ed.44 
In contrast, the “admissibility” of legal negotiations refers to the ability 
of parties, witnesses, and other participants in the negotiation to testify about 
those communications in judicial, legislative, administrative, or other gov-
ernmental hearings. Disclosures in the context of these formal legal proceed-
ings can take many forms. Examples include disclosure pursuant to a deposi-
tion or in response to a discovery request; testimony during a trial; and work 
by other public bodies, such as investigations and hearings by administrative 
agencies, legislatures, and grand juries. Though disclosures to third persons, 
in general, affect private interests, disclosures occurring during the course of 
formal legal proceedings affect public interests. 45 In particular, disclosures in 
formal legal proceedings implicate “the public’s interest in accessing . . . in-
formation pursuant to governmental fact-finding, adjudication, or policy de-
velopment and legal regulation.”46 
The admissibility of these disclosures in formal legal proceedings are the 
focus of Rule 408 and related state laws, and the subject of this Article. This 
                                                                                                                           
and the ‘confidentiality’ of the proceeding”); Richard C. Reuben & Nancy H. Rogers, Major Step 
Forward: Proposed Uniform Mediation Act Goes Public for Comments, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Summer 1999, at 18, 18 (discussing the proposed Uniform Mediation Act and the two key aspects 
of the Act: the confidentiality provisions and exceptions). 
 42 For further discussion, see Reuben, Process Purity, supra note 16, at 283, 295–96. 
 43 Observation evidence is more controversial than verbal or written statements in that an 
observation generally is not considered a statement unless intended as a statement. See FED. R. 
EVID. 801(a) (defining “statement” for purposes of the hearsay rule); see also MODEL CODE OF 
EVID. r. 501 (AM. LAW INST. 1942) (providing model definition of “statement” for the purposes of 
the hearsay rule). 
 44 See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1211, 1234 (2006) (noting that confidentiality documents are frequently drafted during arbitra-
tion). 
 45 Reuben, Confidentiality, supra note 41, at 1261. 
 46 Id. 
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Article gives the terms legal negotiations, settlement discussions, and com-
promise discussions their precise meaning, rather than using them inter-
changeably. This is done mindful of the fact that this Article is concerned 
with the larger subject of legal negotiations, whereas Rule 408 is concerned 
with the narrower form of the compromise discussion. Indeed, this is a critical 
part of the problem addressed herein. 
B. Common Law Origins of Rule 408 and the Policies That Support It 
The English roots of Rule 408 can be traced as far back as 1716,47 and 
its migration to the United States as early as the 1800s.48 According to Wright 
and Graham, “[t]he common law rule . . . was based on the distinction be-
tween ‘express’ and ‘implied’ admissions.”49 Courts were willing to accept 
express admissions but reluctant to receive an implied admission—such as 
might be inferred by an offer of compromise—because the offer may bear no 
relationship to the offeror’s belief in the correctness of their legal position.50 
Over time, the rule has been supported by as many as four policy rationales: 
relevance, contract, fairness, and extrinsic policy.51 
English courts relied on a contract rationale,52 generally holding that the 
offer of a compromise proposal that included “the magic words ‘without 
prejudice’ . . . created a unilateral implied contract that the offer and related 
matter was not to be used in evidence.” 53 
Dean John Henry Wigmore rejected this view in favor of a relevance ra-
tionale to justify the common law rule.54 Wigmore argued that compromise 
evidence is logically irrelevant because it merely expresses the desire to avoid 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Harman v. Vanhatton (1716) 23 Eng. Rep. 1071, 1071 (holding that a defendant’s pre-
vious offer to deliver a bond, conditioned upon whether the plaintiff recovered on an insurance 
policy, was but a nudum pactum, or, naked promise). 
 48 See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED 
RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 3.3.1 n.17 (Richard D. Friedman ed., rev. ed. 2002) (explain-
ing the American adoption of the English version of the modern-day Rule 408); see also Wenin-
ger, supra note 10, at 409, 415 (discussing the pre-Rule 408 chaos). 
 49 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 5302 (1st ed. 1980). 
 50 See id. (noting that Wigmore’s general rule was that “[a]n offer by one party to the other,” 
if it comes “from a desire to end the controversy and not from a concession of the correctness of 
. . . [an] opponent’s case, is . . . an implied admission” and thus inadmissible; an express admis-
sion, however, would be admissible). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See, e.g., Harman, 23 Eng. Rep. at 1071 (describing a pretrial offer as a contract); see also 
David Vaver, “Without Prejudice” Communications—Their Admissibility and Effect, 9 U.B.C. L. 
REV. 85, 87−88 (1974) (describing how early courts viewed settlement proceedings as contractual 
agreements). 
 53 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5302. 
 54 See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE’S CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
LAW § 999 (3d ed. 1942); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5302. 
534 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:523 
litigation and its costs, and “does not . . . imply a specific belief that the ad-
versary’s claim is well founded.”55 
Although Wigmore’s relevance theory was widely accepted during his 
lifetime, some courts also cited a fairness argument in using the rule to ex-
clude evidence.56 Under this rationale, the private settlement of disputes is a 
salutary goal that the law should promote, and it would be unfair—especially 
to the initial proponent of a settlement proposal—to punish an involved party 
for doing what the law favored by making evidence of that compromise pro-
posal subsequently admissible in a court of law.57 
Finally, the policy rationale, found in the English cases as early as 
1852,58 is the rationale Congress relied upon when it adopted Rule 408.59 
This rationale holds that compromise evidence ought to be excluded as a mat-
ter of policy to encourage the resolution of disputes outside the courts.60 The 
policy rationale further recognizes that each time a court admits compromise 
evidence, future parties will be less likely to resort to alternatives to litiga-
tion.61 Wright and Graham suggest that the original compromise evidence 
rationale was similar to that of subsequent remedial repairs, finding the com-
promise evidence irrelevant because of the extrinsic policy favoring party 
resolution of their disputes.62 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1061 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed., 3d ed. 1972). 
 56 LEONARD, supra note 48, § 3.3.4. 
 57 See, e.g., In re The Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that it “was 
prejudicial error to inform a jury deliberating on an award of punitive damages that the defendant 
would be indemnified”) (citing Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1518–21 (9th Cir. 1994)); Doon 
v. Ravey, 49 Vt. 293, 296 (1877) (holding that party admissions made for the purpose of attempt-
ed settlement are privileged and cannot be used against that party if the dispute goes to trial); see 
also LEONARD, supra note 48, § 3.3.4 (discussing the fairness rationale to exclude compromise 
evidence); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5302 (noting that a litigant “who attempts to 
settle . . . [his] claim . . . is likely to feel . . . it is . . . [un]fair . . . [if] his opponent . . . [is] permitted 
to introduce evidence of his good deed to” imply that his claim is baseless). 
 58 See, e.g., Jones v. Foxall (1852) 15 Beav. 388, 396–97 (Eng.) (noting that the court did not 
take into consideration any of the settlement offers or negotiations between the parties, explaining 
that if such notice were allowed, no party would ever attempt to settle a dispute); LEONARD, supra 
note 48, § 3.3.3. 
 59 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 1975 amendment (stating that the dual 
reasons for Rule 408 were, (1) irrelevance of the offer, because it may have been “motivated by a 
desire for peace rather than from . . . [a] weakness [in legal] . . . position,” and, (2) promotion of 
compromise and settlement as a way of resolving conflicts). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See LEONARD, supra note 48, § 3.3.3 (promoting the exclusion of compromise evidence in 
order to encourage settlement conduct, with a view that our adjudication system “could not sur-
vive” if there was a substantial increase of tried cases). 
 62 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5302 (explaining that the oldest justification for 
the rule on evidence of compromise was that it was irrelevant, and noting that a “strong public 
policy favoring negotiated resolution of disputes” weighs heavily in favor of the exclusion of such 
evidence). For a treatment of the earliest common law cases, see Vaver, supra note 52, at 86–88.  
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This smorgasbord of rationales is a significant contributing factor to 
Rule 408’s current state of doctrinal disarray, giving courts a wide variety of 
standards in the case law to use to assess claims to exclude legal negotiation 
evidence. But as this Article demonstrates, Congress’s decision to choose this 
rationale is significant, especially as to the remedy for the problems in the 
Rule 408 jurisprudence proposed in Part IV: redrafting Rule 408 to make it a 
full evidentiary privilege,63 instead of a mere “quasi-privilege[].”64 
C. The Codification Process 
The federal courts have long embraced the English common law rule, 
and, thus, it was a strong candidate for codification during the drafting of the 
first Federal Rules of Evidence in the early 1970s.65 The rule has since been 
amended twice, most recently in 2011, each time becoming more permissive 
in terms of receiving evidence drawn from compromise discussions.66 
1. The Original Version in 1975 
a. Legislative History 
The Judicial Conference of the United States began codifying what 
would become the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1969.67 The usual fault lines 
of purpose, scope, and effect quickly emerged in the discussions of the Judi-
cial Conference Advisory Committee’s (“Advisory Committee”) considera-
tion of the compromise discussion rule.68 More specifically, codifying the 
rule forced the Advisory Committee to confront hard questions regarding the 
compromise discussion’s rationale, the effect of the chosen rationale, and the 
structure for implementing its policy choice.69 
The Advisory Committee’s debate on the rationale reflected the circuit 
courts’ fragmented use of the various rationales for the rule previously dis-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See infra notes 305–364 and accompanying text. 
 64 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5423. 
 65 See Weninger, supra note 10, at 414 (noting “[t]he first sentence of Rule 408 . . . codified 
the law that almost all American courts had [already] agreed upon”). 
 66 Reasonable minds can differ on whether the presumption is against the admissibility of 
such evidence, or in favor it. For further discussion, see infra notes 117–127 and accompanying 
text. 
 67 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 1.2 n.7 (4th 
ed. 2012). 
 68 See id. § 1.2 (discussing the composition of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
and the atmosphere surrounding the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most notably 
“claims of executive privilege by President Nixon”). 
 69 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules. 
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cussed.70 The Committee ultimately settled on the policy rationale as the fun-
damental principle upon which to craft its rule.71 
Agreement on the rationale only went so far, as the drafters also had to 
consider the implications of that choice, both substantively and procedurally. 
i. The Fundamental Tension 
Substantively, choosing the extrinsic policy rationale, rather than a con-
cern about the integrity or utility of the evidence, forced the drafters to con-
front the fundamental tension that admissibility in alternative dispute resolu-
tion (“ADR”) processes presents. This tension is between the legal system’s 
need for access to “every man’s evidence,”72 and an ADR process’s need to 
preclude access to information disclosed during the dispute resolution process 
in order to facilitate candor and communication.73 
At a minimum, the extrinsic policy rationale required the drafters to pre-
clude some evidence in order to fulfill their chosen policy preference. But 
precisely how much to preclude would reflect a choice as to how this funda-
mental tension would be balanced. Three options illustrate the difference and 
the range of possibilities. 
The first option would have been to make compromise discussions po-
tentially admissible, thus simply leaving its actual admissibility to the court 
through a motion in limine about its legal relevance or other technical de-
vice.74 This would have been a value-neutral approach to the fundamental 
tension, favoring neither the litigation nor the compromise process, and in-
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Weninger, supra note 10, at 414 (discussing how the adoption of Rule 408 “ended 
division” amongst the courts by “promoting negotiations” as the driving force behind the bar on 
settlement evidence). 
 71 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (noting promotion of 
settlement discussions is “a more consistently impressive ground”); see also Weninger, supra note 
10, at 414 n.31 (noting the five main reasons presented by courts explaining the exclusion of com-
promise evidence). But see Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Comments on H.R. 5463 Dealing with Federal Rules of Evidence 
as Said Bill Passed the House of Representatives (May 22, 1974) [hereinafter Standing Committee 
Comments], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST09-1974.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TB4L-RK5Z] (suggesting the only considered rationale was that “[t]he common law recog-
nized a strong public policy favoring the out-of-court settlement of disputes”). 
 72 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (“‘[T]he public . . . has a right to 
every man’s evidence.’”) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
 73 For a discussion of this principle in other dispute resolution processes, see Reuben, Confi-
dentiality, supra note 41, at 1257 (discussing confidentiality in arbitration process); Reuben, Om-
buds, supra note 41, at 385–86 (summarizing new ABA ombuds standards); Reuben, Dust Set-
tling, supra note 8, at 107 (examining confidentiality in the mediation process). 
 74 “[L]egal relevance . . . . refers to the process of weighing the probative value of the evi-
dence against the dangers to the opposing party of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, undue 
delay, waste of time, cumulativeness, or violations of confidentiality.” Jackson v. Mills, 142 
S.W.3d 237, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
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stead simply flagging the evidence for the court as potentially problematic. 
The second option would have been to tilt the scale in favor of compromise 
discussion process needs by making it presumptively inadmissible—that is, 
unless there was, at some level, a need for the evidence sufficient to over-
come the policy of exclusion. The third option would be to go the other way 
and tilt the scale in favor of the judicial process by making such evidence pre-
sumptively admissible unless there was a need for preclusion sufficient to 
override the general policy favoring admissibility. 
ii. The “Quasi-Privilege” Compromise 
The Advisory Committee ultimately chose the second option, favoring 
the compromise process by creating a categorical rule of inadmissibility with 
exceptions—categorical in the sense that if the evidence was derived from a 
compromise discussion and was about the compromise, the evidence was 
excluded unless an exception applied. The draft rule left little room for judi-
cial discretion. 
The Advisory Committee finally had to determine the formal structure 
of the rule. Because the Committee had rejected the relevance theory, its poli-
cy choices could not simply be implemented through a particular application 
of that doctrine. Rather, the Committee needed to establish a way to articulate 
the rule and chose what is referred to as a “species of privilege.”75 
If it was a “species of privilege,” an evolutionary doctrinalist might sug-
gest that the final articulation of the compromise discussion rule was genera-
tions removed from its ancestral predecessor in doctrine.76 According to The 
New Wigmore, “privileges are the evidentiary rules that allow a person who 
communicated in confidence or who possesses confidential information to 
shield the communication or information from compelled disclosure during 
litigation. So defined[,] . . . a privilege is distinct from a broader power to dis-
qualify a potential witness altogether.”77 
The final articulation of Rule 408 is readily distinguishable from a privi-
lege in a few critical respects. First, rather than limiting its applicability to 
specific holders of the privilege, Rule 408 generally operates as a rule of 
court, one that is self-executing and does not need to be invoked. Similarly, 
privileges generally permit holders to waive the privilege if they so desire. 
Not so with Rule 408: it is always in place and may not be waived. 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 277 n.33 
(1978). 
 76 For further discussion, see infra notes 312–333 and accompanying text. For a discussion of 
the traditional elements of privilege, see EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVI-
DENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 1.3 (2d ed. 2009) (“Distinguishing Privileges from Other Doctrines”). 
 77 Id. § 1.1 (footnote omitted). 
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On the other hand, Rule 408 as drafted does meet certain other criteria 
that The New Wigmore identifies as distinguishing privileges from other evi-
dentiary doctrines. For one, it is a procedural rule rather than a substantive 
rule.78 More importantly, it is driven by extrinsic concerns promoting settle-
ment rather than institutional concerns about the integrity of the evidence or 
the proper function of the adversarial system.79 Finally, it applies only in judi-
cial proceedings and does not apply in other formal contexts, such as grand 
jury proceedings, administrative hearings, or arbitrations.80 
Because some elements of privilege clearly apply to the evidentiary ex-
clusion for compromise discussions while others do not, evidence scholarship 
often term the compromise discussion rule as a “quasi-privilege.”81 As is of-
ten the case with committee compromises, the result is strained, contorted, 
and at times arguably incoherent, as the struggle over the fundamental tension 
permeated the final draft of the 1975 rule. 
b. The Statutory Text 
As enacted, the 1975 version of the rule reads as follows: 
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or 
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consid-
eration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim 
which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissi-
ble to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the ex-
clusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is 
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also 
does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing 
a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a crim-
inal investigation or prosecution.82 
The rule is widely acknowledged for being “poorly drafted.”83 The first 
and second sentences contain the basic categorical rule of inadmissibility; the 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. § 1.3. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 49, § 5423. 
 82 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, Rule 408, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (codified as the 
Federal Rules of Evidence at 28 U.S.C. app. (1982)). 
 83 Letter from Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Honorable An-
thony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Dec. 5, 2002), http://
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first speaks to written and verbal communications, and the second addresses 
conduct that has the effect of communication, such as the nodding of one’s 
head. However, one can see the fundamental tension at work in the rule’s al-
most bizarre complexity. 
Upon close inspection, the general rule can be divided into at least three 
parts: the act of communication, the topic of communication, and the purpose 
for which the communication is being tendered into evidence. A communica-
tion is covered by the rule, and thus precluded from admissibility, only if it 
“furnish[es]” or “accept[s]” the communication of “valuable consideration” in 
order to “compromise” the “validity or amount” of a “disputed” “claim.”84 
Even then, the evidence is precluded only if it is being offered to prove liabil-
ity for a claim or the amount due.85 
House and Senate conferees split on a few particularly contentious is-
sues. Several federal agencies—including the Department of the Treasury, 
Justice Department, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—
voiced concerns that the rule would serve as a shield to preclude them access 
to compromise discussion evidence that was verified by independent evi-
dence.86 The conferees ultimately decided to make clear that the rule did not 
preclude the admissibility of otherwise admissible evidence,87 stating in the 
third sentence: “This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence oth-
erwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compro-
mise negotiations.”88 
The fourth and final sentence reflected the significant additional limita-
tions of the rule. It stated, “[t]his rule also does not require exclusion when 
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice 
of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to 
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”89 By its plain language, this 
sentence underscores the limited nature of the evidentiary exclusion by mak-
ing clear that compromise communication evidence can be used for purposes 
other than the narrow prohibited use. The exception then offers three broad 
examples of situations in which such compromise discussion evidence can be 
admitted—proving bias, non-delay, and obstruction of crime—and indicates 
                                                                                                                           
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV12-2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2TP-2ZXA] 
[hereinafter Smith Evidence Letter]; see also BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE REDBOOK: A MAN-
UAL ON LEGAL STYLE 539 (3d ed. 2013) (“As with almost all other writing, legislative drafting 
has as its touchstones clarity, accuracy, and brevity—clarity being foremost.”). 
 84 Rule 408, 88 Stat. at 1933. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Standing Committee Comments, supra note 71, at 17–19. 
 87See Rule 408, 88 Stat. at 1933. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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that this is not an exclusive list by introducing them with the word “includ-
ing.”90 
As drafted then, Rule 408 was extraordinarily narrow, limited to a very 
specific type of communication—evidence of compromise—offered for a 
very particular purpose: to prove liability for, or the amount of, the claim. 
Even then, it was subject to major exceptions for impeachment and criminal 
matters. All other communications derived from settlement discussions were 
freely admissible under the rule. 
2. The 2006 Amendments 
Rule 408 remained unchanged until April 2002, when the Advisory 
Committee on Evidence agreed to consider whether it should be amended 
with respect to its applicability in criminal cases.91 By October, the Commit-
tee expanded its scope to include whether statements made in settlement ne-
gotiations should be admissible for purposes of impeachment for prior incon-
sistent statements, and whether offers to settle could be introduced into trial 
by the offering party.92 The Committee’s scope continued to expand when it 
came to realize the significant questions about the intent and scope of the rule 
as previously drafted.93 
The amendment process for Rule 408 took several years. The Advisory 
Committee released its first draft for public comment in 2004, addressing 
                                                                                                                           
 90 HILLEL Y. LEVIN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A PRACTICAL LAWYERING COURSE 209 
(2014). 
 91 See Letter from Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to 
Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 1, 
2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV5-2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZV7-
5YPQ] (indicating that the Advisory Committee deemed it necessary to consider the admissibility 
of compromise evidence in “related criminal litigation”). Compare United States v. Arias, 431 
F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that Rule 408 applies in a criminal trial), with United 
States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 408 is “inapplicable in the 
criminal context”). 
 92 Smith Evidence Letter, supra note 83. Compare Hernandez v. State, 52 P.3d 765, 769 
(Ariz. 2002) (allowing “evidence obtained in the course of compromise negotiations . . . for im-
peachment purposes”), with EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 948 F.2d 1542, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding a decision not to admit evidence obtained in settlement negotiations for impeachment 
purposes). 
 93 Smith Evidence Letter, supra note 83 (describing the issue of scope along three questions: 
“a) whether evidence of a civil compromise is admissible in subsequent criminal litigation; b) 
whether statements made during settlement negotiations can be admitted to impeach a party for 
prior inconsistent statement; and c) whether an offer to settle can be admitted in favor of the party 
who made the offer”). Although the underlying memorandum the committee relied on in reaching 
these conclusions is not archived, others have noted these areas contained “extensive case law.” 
E.g., Gregory B. Collins & Andrew F. Halaby, Of “Purposes Not Prohibited”: New Federal Rule 
of Evidence 408(B), 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 679, 684–85 (2007) (noting that the committee’s 
intent in adding the amendment was to preserve the rich case history). 
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“[a]dmissibility in criminal cases,”94 the “[s]cope of the ‘impeachment’ ex-
ception,”95 evidence offered by the party who made the offer,96 and the rule’s 
organization “to make it easier to read and apply.”97 This version of the rule 
was rejected after harsh public criticism to the proposed criminal context 
changes.98 There were five key lines of criticism: 
1) the rule would deter settlement discussions; 2) it would create a 
trap for the poorly counseled and the otherwise unwary, who might 
not know that statements of fault made in a settlement of a civil 
case might later be used against them in a criminal case; 3) it would 
allow private parties to abuse the rule by threatening to give over to 
the government alleged statements of fault made during private set-
tlement negotiations; 4) it would result in attorneys having to be-
come witnesses against their civil clients in a subsequent criminal 
case, as a lawyer may be called to testify about a statement that ei-
ther the lawyer or the client made in a settlement negotiation; and 
5) it would raise a problematic distinction between protected offers 
and unprotected statements and conduct—a distinction that was re-
jected as unworkable when Rule 408 was originally enacted.99 
The Advisory Committee released its second draft addressing those con-
cerns on April 12, 2006.100 This version was finally adopted and became ef-
fective on December 1, 2006, reading as follows: 
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise 
(a) Prohibited uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on 
behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity 
of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Letter from Honorable Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to 
Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 15, 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV5-2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8L6-M6XL] 
(proposing that statements of fault made during settlement negotiations be admitted in a subse-
quent criminal case, but not allowing offers or acceptances of civil settlements to be admitted, “in 
deference to the Justice Department’s arguments that such statements can be critical evidence of 
guilt”).  
 95 See id. (stating that in order to be consistent with the goals of the rule, statements made in 
settlement negotiations would not be admissible in trial for impeachment purposes to show con-
tradiction or a prior inconsistent statement). 
 96 See id. (“The proposed amendment would bar a party from introducing its own statements 
and offers . . . to prove the validity, invalidity, or the amount of the claim.”). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 28th, 2005, at 3–5, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV04-2005-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2MQ-
E767]. 
 99 Id. at 4. 
 100 See Weninger, supra note 10, at 402–03 n.1 (describing the process by which the rule was 
adopted). 
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or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradic-
tion: 
 (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or accept-
ing or offering or promising to accept—a valuable consideration 
in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and 
 (2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations 
regarding the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and 
the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in 
the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. 
(b) Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evi-
dence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Ex-
amples of permissible purposes include proving a witness’s bias or 
prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an ef-
fort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.101 
Though it was scarcely noticed and drew little commentary,102 the 2006 
amendments rewrote the rule significantly. First, they simplified the rule by 
changing its structure from a categorical rule of exclusion with limited excep-
tions to a rule consisting of two classes of uses of compromise discussion 
evidence: that which is excluded from admission (“Prohibited Uses”), and 
that which is admissible (“Permitted Uses”).103 The core principle remained 
embodied in the first part of the rule, which had become 408(a), which again 
stated that if the evidence is of a certain category—drawn from a compromise 
discussion and used to establish liability, the amount of a dispute, or a “prior 
inconsistent statement”—it is inadmissible barring an exception.104 There is 
no room for judicial discretion. 
The second part of the rule, 408(b), provides the exceptions to the gen-
eral categorical rule.105 Although the specifically enumerated exceptions 
largely track the language of the 1975 draft, the title for this section—“Per-
mitted Uses”—suggests a more permissive attitude toward the evidence than 
the 1975 draft’s mere acknowledgement that “[t]his rule also does not require 
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose . . . .”106 This shift 
in language shifted the tone of the rule, and gave attorneys a stronger basis for 
                                                                                                                           
 101 FED. R. EVID. 408 (2006) (amended 2011). 
 102 See Weninger, supra note 10, at 402 (detailing an empirical study of attorneys’ reactions 
to the amendment of Rule 408). This is believed to be the only article published on the 2006 ver-
sion of Rule 408. 
 103 FED. R. EVID. 408 (2006) (amended 2011). 
 104 Id. 408(a). 
 105 Id. 408(b) (“Examples of permissible purposes include proving a witness’s bias or preju-
dice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investiga-
tion or prosecution.”). 
 106 See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, Rule 408, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (codified as the 
Federal Rules of Evidence at 28 U.S.C. app. (1982)). 
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arguing compromise discussion evidence was admissible because it was rec-
ognized as affirmatively admissible rather than a mere exception to a general 
rule of exclusion. 
The 2006 amendments also engrafted a new exception into Rule 
408(a)(2) for actions involving government agencies107—further evidence of 
a more relaxed attitude toward the admissibility of the evidence. As noted 
above, prosecutorial concern about the effect of the compromise evidence bar 
on criminal and regulatory prosecutions was one of the primary drivers for 
the reformulation of Rule 408 in 2006.108 Rather than including it as an “other 
purposes” exception, however, the drafters chose to incorporate it specifically 
in 408(a)(2)’s definition of the general rule.109 In so doing, the drafters also 
broadened the scope of the rule beyond compromise discussions, extending it 
to statements “offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a 
[government] claim.”110 
The 1975 rule also permitted compromise discussion evidence to be 
used for “proving bias or prejudice of a witness.”111 The 2006 version of 
408(a) placed some limitations on this use, however, thus appearing to re-
spond to what the practice community considered to be a significant loophole 
in the general rule in 1975. In particular, the 2006 version expressly disal-
lowed the use of compromise evidence for purposes of “impeach[ment] 
through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction.”112 Still, the 2006 
rules did not completely bar the use of compromise discussions for purposes 
of impeachment because 408(b) specifically incorporated the language from 
the 1975 version permitting use of the evidence to prove bias or prejudice.113 
Thus, although compromise discussion evidence cannot be used to prove that 
a witness is lying or mistaken, it can be used to show that the witness is bi-
ased.114 This remains a significant loophole in the rule. 
Finally, the revision certainly was more comprehensible than the word 
salad of the 1975 rule. However, it still left ample room for confusion by the 
uninitiated. For example, the labels “permitted uses” and prohibited uses” 
                                                                                                                           
 107 FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (2006) (amended 2011) (excepting conduct or statements “when 
offered in a criminal case and the negotiations relate[] to a claim by a public office or agency in 
the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority”). 
 108 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 109 See FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (2006) (amended 2011) (“Evidence of the following is not admissi-
ble[:] . . . conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except when 
offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the 
exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.”) (emphasis added). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Rule 408, 88 Stat. at 1933. 
 112 FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (2006) (amended 2011). 
 113 Compare id. (“proving a witness’s bias or prejudice”), with Rule 408, 88 Stat. at 1933 
(“proving bias or prejudice of a witness”). 
 114 FED. R. EVID. 408(b) (2006) (amended 2011). 
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refer to uses of the evidence, but could easily be read to refer to uses of the 
rule of exclusion. Similarly, subsection (a) states four particular uses narrow-
ing the rule of inadmissibility—to prove liability for, invalidity of, sum of 
disputed amounts or prior inconsistent statements—before using sixty-six 
words to describe the evidence that is subject to the rule.115 Finally, subsec-
tion (b), too, describes permitted uses in terms of the double negative “does 
not require exclusion.”116 Though improved, the revised rule remained mind-
bending. 
3. The 2011 Amendments 
The most recent revision of Rule 408, part of the major 2011 revision of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, was held out to be “stylistic only,” with “no 
intent to change.”117 Indeed, the Advisory Committee agreed to consider the 
project only so long as no substantive changes would be made.118 In fact, the 
language of the rule continued to become more permissive and its structure 
came to resemble a presumption of admissibility rather than a categorical rule 
of inadmissibility with exceptions. This was due, in part, to an enhanced role 
that the 2011 amendments gave the courts. Stylistic changes sometimes have 
substantive effects, even if unintentional, and many courts prefer to rely on a 
statute’s text, without further analysis into statutory history or legislative pur-
pose.119 
As enacted, the 2011 amendments,120 still in effect as of this writing, ap-
pear as follows: 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. 408(a). 
 116 Id. 408(b). 
 117 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment. 
 118 Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 24–25, 2006, at 12, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV04-2006-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/8384-
YTC4]. 
 119 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990) 
(comparing the Supreme Court’s traditional textual approach, where ambiguity is resolved by 
legislative history, to one championed by the late Justice Scalia, who famously decried legislative 
history); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424 (2005) 
(arguing that even the strictest of textualists believe in intent as a construct that invariably inures 
itself into the text). Justice Scalia stated, “I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpret-
ing the meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its 
textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any 
clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If not—and 
especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that ordinary mean-
ing.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 120 The timetable for the rules was as follows: In November 2007, the committee established a 
timeline for the project. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Novem-
ber 16, 2007, at 6–7, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV11-2007-min.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HDQ7-FEEY]. A proposed version of the reworded version of Rule 408 was 
nearly unanimously approved during the May 2008 meeting. Letter from Robert L. Hinkle, Chair, 
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Rule 408. Compromise Offers and Negotiations 
(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible—
on behalf of any party—either to prove or disprove the validity or 
amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent 
statement or a contradiction: 
 (1) furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promis-
ing to accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and 
 (2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotia-
tions about the claim—except when offered in a criminal case 
and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in 
the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement au-
thority. 
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another pur-
pose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a con-
tention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution.121 
The 2011 amendments retained the basic structure of the 2006 revision 
but made subtle changes to Rule 408(b) that loosened the rule further to allow 
greater admissibility of compromise discussion evidence. The key battle-
ground was the first sentence in 408(b).122 The two previous versions had 
stated that the rule did not “require exclusion.”123 The final 2011 version, 
however, states: “The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, 
such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue 
                                                                                                                           
Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on 
Rules of Practice & Procedure 3 (May 12, 2008) [hereinafter Hinkle Letter], www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/fr_import/EV06-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6UQ-TB8Q]. The restyled rules 
were approved by the U.S. Judicial Conference in the fall of 2011, which then transmitted them to 
the Supreme Court. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 1, 
2011, at 2, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/2011-04-Evidence-Minutes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M3XS-ZM43]. The Court recommended restoring the “in compromising or 
attempting to compromise the claim” language. Id. at 2–3. The committee agreed with the pro-
posal. Id. at 4. Later that month, the Supreme Court approved the rules. Letter from Honorable 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, to John A. Boehner, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/frev11.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDB2-L7MB]. Congress declined to act and the rules 
took effect on December 1, 2011. 
 121 FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 122 Id. 408(b). Interestingly, the “may be admitted” language was hotly disputed when it was 
suggested during discussions on Rule 407, but it was adopted. Similar arguments were swiftly 
rejected during discussions concerning Rule 408. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s notes 
on proposed rules. 
 123 FED. R. EVID. 408(b) (2006) (amended 2011) (emphasis added); Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. 
L. No. 93-595, Rule 408, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (codified as the Federal Rules of Evidence at 28 
U.S.C. app. (1982)) (emphasis added). 
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delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion.”124 
Proponents of the change had argued that it avoided double negatives, 
“achieve[d] the same result in practice,” and maintained consistency with the 
other rules that use that phrase.125 Dissenters, however, led by the Reporter of 
the Advisory Committee, Daniel Capra of Fordham Law School, contended 
the new wording “provided a positive grant of admissibility.”126 
This was more than a mere academic concern. Unlike the 2006 version, 
the 2011 exceptions are described in terms of admissibility instead of exclu-
sion and explicitly insert authority for judicial discretion into the text for the 
first time.127 This completed the conversion of the text of Rule 408 from one 
of a categorical rule of exclusion to a rule of presumptive admissibility sub-
ject to specific exceptions that would be applied with judicial discretion. 
D. Synthesis: The Substantive Transformation of Rule 408 
The changes drafted into Rule 408 in 2006 and 2011 have had readily 
discernible substantive effects, as the following hypothetical demonstrates.128 
Assume Apple sues Google, alleging numerous similarities between Google’s 
“Android” software and Apple’s “iOS” software, both of which are loaded on 
mobile phones.129 Although Google is responsible for the core version of 
                                                                                                                           
 124 FED. R. EVID. 408(b) (emphasis added). 
 125 Hinkle Letter, supra note 120; see FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 2011 
amendment (“Rule 408 previously provided that evidence was not excluded if offered for a pur-
pose not explicitly prohibited by the Rule . . . . [I]t now provides that the court may admit evidence 
. . . .” (emphasis added)); see also FED. R. EVID. 103(c), 201(b), 201(c)(1), 403, 405 (promulgat-
ing rules in permissive fashion, rather than utilizing double negatives); Advisory Comm. on Evi-
dence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of May 1–2, 2008, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/EV2008-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR4N-
GSDA] (noting “the change was stylistic rather than substantive”). 
 126 Minutes of the Meeting of May 1–2, supra note 125 (noting “the change was stylistic 
rather than substantive”). 
 127 See FED. R. EVID. 408(b) (“The court may admit this evidence . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 128 The following is a “test suite” as described in EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRIT-
ING 21–31 (3d ed. 2007). 
 129 This hypothetical is inspired by litigation between Apple and Samsung, including the U.S. 
case. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1372−73 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Apple and 
Samsung were involved in similar suits in Japan and South Korea. See, e.g., Leigh Kamping-
Carder, Apple Hits Samsung with Smartphone IP Suit, LAW360 (June 24, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/253669/apple-hits-samsung-with-smartphone-ip-suit [https://perma.cc/
R723-H5HJ] (describing Apple’s allegations of patent infringement by Samsung in the Seoul 
Central District Court); Jonathan Randles, Apple Loses Japan Appeal over Samsung Synch Tech, 
LAW360 (June 25, 2013, 2:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/452789/apple-loses-japan-
appeal-over-samsung-synch-tech [https://perma.cc/WAM4-4D4P] (describing Japan’s Intellectual 
Property High Court ruling against Apple). 
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“Android,” once the software is released, other manufacturers may make their 
own alterations to the software.130 
Assume further that Apple has also taken an aggressive litigation strate-
gy and filed suit against phone manufacturers Samsung, Motorola Solutions, 
and LG Corporation as joint defendants (collectively “the Manufacturers”).131 
Thus, there will be two trials: one between Apple and Google, and later a sec-
ond trial between Apple and the Manufacturers. Both Google and the Manu-
facturers are aware of the other suit. 
For purposes of this hypothetical, assume Apple and Google engaged in 
unsuccessful compromise discussions before trial. Assume further that during 
the Apple-Google negotiations, Google’s representative furnished written 
statements showing communications between Google and the Manufacturers 
indicating that the Manufacturers knew the phones could be altered to avoid 
potentially infringing upon Apple’s patents, but decided against taking this 
step because it would be too costly. 
In the hypothetical trial between Apple and Google, Apple seeks to in-
troduce two statements furnished by Google during the failed compromise 
discussion. The first statement is about Google’s awareness of the potentially 
infringing similarities between Apple’s iPhone software and its own Android 
software. This may be termed the “Google Infringement Statement.” 
The second statement is about the Manufacturers’ knowledge about the 
potential to avoid infringing on Apple’s patent. Apple will seek to introduce 
this statement in the Google trial to show the Manufacturers’ state of mind—
that the Manufacturers willfully disregarded Apple’s patent. This may be 
termed the “Manufacturers’ Willfulness Statement.” 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Android is an “open source” program that is editable by downstream consumers. This prac-
tice results in different “flavors” of Android, widely called “fragmentation.” See About the Android 
Open Source Project, ANDROID, https://source.android.com [https://perma.cc/9EN7-LLN5] (provid-
ing an overview of the open source process by which developers can create content); Open Won-
der: Introducing Android 8.0 Oreo™, ANDROID, https://www.android.com/versions/oreo-8-0/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z36V-JPM7] (describing the latest flavor as “oreo”); The Many Faces of a Little 
Green Robot, OPENSIGNAL (Aug. 2012), https://opensignal.com/reports/fragmentation.php [https://
perma.cc/5YV9-YB3D] (explaining the strengths and weaknesses of fragmentation). 
 131 In this hypothetical, each of these lawsuits has satisfied the requirements for federal jurisdic-
tion. Additionally, please note “Motorola” was later split into “Motorola Mobility” and “Motorola 
Solutions.” Jennifer Rooney, A Year Post-Split from Motorola Mobility, How Motorola Solutions Is 
Marketing Its Brand, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2012, 9:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennifer
rooney/2012/01/23/a-year-post-split-from-motorola-mobility-how-motorola-solutions-is-marketing-
its-brand/#3f925f4c667e [https://perma.cc/73SC-42M2]. Motorola Mobility is owned by Google, 
but Motorola Solutions remains independent and is the successor corporation. Id.; Elizabeth 
Woyke, Motorola Solutions CEO on the Google-Motorola Merger, Patents and Brand, FORBES 
(Oct. 19, 2011, 6:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethwoyke/2011/10/19/motorola-
solutions-ceo-on-the-google-motorola-merger-patents-and-brand/#4727acad74e4 [https://perma.
cc/E3M5-397H]. 
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Assume the hypothetical Apple v. Google trial will be before the Apple v. 
Manfacturers trial. Assume further that Samsung will intervene as a matter of 
right in the first trial to object to the introduction of the Manufacturers’ Will-
fulness Statement, because of the potential damage in Apple’s later trial 
against the Manufacturers if the statement is admitted in the Google trial and 
becomes a public record.132 
Because the analytical approach of Rule 408 does not differ between tri-
als, this section’s focus is only on the first trial. 
A threshold question is whether Rule 408 even applies, because the facts 
described clearly meet the rule’s fundamental requirement that the proposed 
compromise discussion was, in fact, about compromise in the sense contem-
plated by the rule in terms of the exchange of economic value. Many state-
ments made in a settlement negotiation of this nature will not be about the 
economic value exchange, and those statements would not qualify for the 
protection of the rule and therefore be readily admissible. For purposes of 
analyzing the differences between the different versions of Rule 408, one 
could further assume that the particular statements were made in the context 
of the compromise of economic value, thus meeting that initial criteria. 
1. Result Under the 1975 Version of Rule 408 
In the Apple v. Google trial, a court using the 1975 version of the rule 
could admit the Google Infringement Statement but not the Manufacturers’ 
Willfulness Statement. 
Apple would seek to introduce the Google Infringement Statement after 
a proffer by Google that it was unaware of the potential for infringement. Ap-
ple thus would argue that the purpose of introducing this evidence is to im-
peach the credibility of Google’s testimony, reasoning that this falls within 
the ambit of the bias or prejudice exceptions because they are forms of im-
peachment. Although it is a close case, a court could plausibly rule in favor of 
Apple and admit this evidence. 
However, a court would be more likely to reject Apple’s effort to intro-
duce the Manufacturers’ Willfulness Statement in the trial against Google to 
show its state of mind. In construing the 1975 version of Rule 408, the court 
would recognize that the rule establishes a general prohibition on the intro-
duction of compromise discussion evidence, subject to specifically enumerat-
ed exceptions, and that state of mind evidence does not fall within the ambit 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). The Advisory Committee contemplated such an eventuality and 
opined that the rule applies even to settlement discussion evidence between a litigant and a third 
party. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules; see also In re MSTG, 
Inc., 675 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (allowing a party to object to introduction of settlement 
discussion evidence involving a settlement to which it was not a party). 
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of any of them. The court would therefore look to the purpose of the default 
rule and preclude the evidence so as to encourage future compromise discus-
sions. 
2. Result Under the 2006 Amendments to Rule 408 
The results would be different under the 2006 amendments. Apple again 
will seek to introduce the Google Infringement Statement over Google’s ob-
jection. The court would clearly reject this proffer under the 2006 rules, how-
ever, because the rules expressly preclude the introduction of evidence for 
purposes of impeachment through prior inconsistent statements. 
The court would also reject Apple’s attempt to introduce the Manufac-
turers’ Willfulness Statement, as it would have under the 1975 rules. The 
2006 rules, however, call for a different analysis. The evidence again is being 
offered to show Google’s state of mind: it knew its software infringed Apple’s 
patent. The court would first look at the text of the new rule and decide if the 
proffered “state of mind” evidence is “prohibited” or “permitted.” The court 
would likely conclude initially that the statement is prohibited under Rule 
408(a)(2) because it was “made in [a] compromise negotiation[].”133 
It would then look to Rule 408(b) to see if the proffer is nonetheless a 
permissible use of the compromise discussion statement because it is being 
introduced for another purpose not prohibited by subdivision (a).134Such an 
inquiry is possible because, unlike the 1975 rule, the 2006 rule introduces the 
list of permitted uses with the word “including,” thus indicating the list is not 
exclusive.135 Because the “state of mind” evidence is not akin to “proving a 
witness’ bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving 
an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution,” the court would 
likely apply the doctrine of noscitur a sociis and find the evidence is not ad-
missible.136 
3. Result Under the 2011 Version of Rule 408 
Under the 2011 amendments, the court’s analysis of the Google In-
fringement Statement does not change, and the statements would be expressly 
precluded by the statute. 
                                                                                                                           
 133 FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (2006) (amended 2011). 
 134 See id. 408(b) (“This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes 
not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible uses include . . . .”). 
 135 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01 (6th ed. 
2000) (“[t]he plain meaning rule”). 
 136 See id. § 47:16 (“Associated words”); see also FED. R. EVID. 408. The doctrine of noscitur 
a sociis means “it is known from its associates,” and allows for the clarification of the meaning of 
a word by referring to “associated words.” SINGER, supra note 135, § 47:16. 
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The court, however, would likely reach a different result on the Manu-
facturers’ Willfulness Statement. The 1975 rules would bar its introduction 
because state of mind was not one of the specifically enumerated exceptions. 
Under the 2006 rules, the state of mind evidence would likely have been re-
jected as too far removed from the ambit of the specifically enumerated ex-
ceptions, causing the court to rely instead on the general default rule of inad-
missibility. The 2011 rules, however, shift the default from a presumption that 
compromise discussion evidence is inadmissible unless there is ample reason 
to admit it, to a presumption that such is admissible unless there is ample rea-
son to exclude it. 
In this situation, then, the Manufacturers’ Willfulness Statement would 
be presumptively admissible unless it falls within the realm of exceptions. 
The court would have considerable discretion to admit the evidence because 
Rule 408(b) provides that a court “may admit this evidence for another pur-
pose,” and then introduces the exceptions with the phrase “such as ” to indi-
cate the list is exemplary and not exclusive.137 Because it has already been 
demonstrated that the “Manufacturer’s Willfulness Statement” does not fall 
within the list of exceptions, the court could rely on the general default rule of 
admissibility and permit the introduction of the evidence. 
To summarize, then, the different versions of Rule 408 can lead to dif-
ferent results that can have significant impacts on judicial proceedings. The 
1975 version was the one that most states used to model their own rules re-
garding compromise, and it is to that issue this Article now turns—mindful of 
the fact that most of the state versions modeled on that version are now in-
consistent with the 2011 version of Federal Rule 408. 
Figure 1138 
 
  Result 
Statement Purpose 1975 2006 2011 
Google  
Infringement 
Impeachment Admitted Excluded Excluded 
Manufacturers’ 
Willfulness 
State of Mind Excluded Excluded Admitted 
E. Rule 408 in the States 
Until the modern era, most evidence rules at the state level were con-
trolled by the common law, including the compromise discussion rule.139 The 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See FED. R. EVID. 408(b). 
 138 This Figure is permanently available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-2/reuben-
graphics-A1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2X7-4PFR]. 
 139 See supra notes 47–64 and accompanying text. 
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compilation of evidence rules into a single code, as part of a larger codifica-
tion effort, most notably began in 1942 with the American Law Institute’s 
Model Code of Evidence.140 Later, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws proposed the Uniform Rules of Evidence.141 Alt-
hough four states initially adopted these uniform rules,142 only Kansas has 
retained them in the modern era.143 
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, many states 
quickly moved to conform their evidence rules to the new federal standard. 
Within a year after codification, five states had adopted the federal rules.144 
By 1983, that number increased by another twenty-two states,145 and, by the 
fall of 2010, forty-three states had formally adopted rules modeled after Rule 
408.146 Currently, over forty states have codified rules that are “identical” or 
similar to some version of Rule 408.147 As of this writing, twenty-eight states 
have rules based on the 1975 version,148 whereas four states have updated 
their rules to track the 2006 version,149 and Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and 
West Virginia have adopted the restyled rule.150 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF RULE 408 AND RELATED STATE LAWS 
The foregoing discussion has focused exclusively on the compromise 
discussion rule as a matter of positive statutory law. Even then, this Article 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify—That Is the Question: A Study of New 
York’s Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641, 655 (1992). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452 (West 2017). 
 144 Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of 
Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 256 (1984). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Tom Lininger, Should Oregon Adopt the New Federal Rules of Evidence?, 89 OR. L. REV. 
1407, 1408 (2011). 
 147 DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY 
(rev. ed. Supp. 2018), Westlaw. Footnotes 148–150 are based roughly on Leonard’s The New 
Wigmore. 
 148 ALASKA R. EVID. 408; ARK. R. EVID. 408; CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-8; FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 90.408 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-408 (West 2017); HAW. R. EVID. 408; IDAHO R. 
EVID. 408; KY. R. EVID. 408; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 408 (West 2017); MD. R. EVID. 5-408; 
MICH. R. EVID. 408; MINN. R. EVID. 408; MISS. R. EVID. 408; MONT. R. EVID. 408; NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-408 (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.105 (West 2017); N.H. R. EVID. 
408; N.J. R. EVID. 408; N.C. R. EVID. 408; OHIO R. EVID. 408; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2408 
(West 2017); OR. R. EVID. 408; R.I. R. EVID. 408; S.C. R. EVID. 408; TENN. R. EVID. 408; WASH. 
R. EVID. 408; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.08 (West 2017); WYO. R. EVID. 408. 
 149 ALA. R. EVID. 408; COLO. R. EVID. 408; PA. R. EVID. 408; VT. R. EVID. 408. 
 150 DEL. R. EVID. 408; IND. R. EVID. 408; IOWA R. EVID. 5.408; ME. R. EVID. 408; MISS. R. 
EVID. 408; N.M. R. EVID. 11-408; N.D. R. EVID. 408; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-408 (2017); 
TEX. R. EVID. 408; UTAH R. EVID. 408; W. VA. R. EVID. 408(b). 
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has already shown that there is a great disparity between the popular under-
standing of the rule as generally barring the introduction of legal negotiations 
evidence and its literal wording as a narrow evidentiary exclusion for certain 
aspects of compromise discussions under certain conditions, and even then 
under limited circumstances. This Part looks at the case law that has devel-
oped under the rule in both state and federal courts. As with the drafting, one 
can see the power of the fundamental tension in the willingness of courts to 
sacrifice Rule 408’s principle of inadmissibility to the immediate needs of 
justice in the cases before them by allowing parties access to the evidence 
they need to prove their cases. 
A. Methodology for Analyzing Federal and State Court Cases 
The methodology for this analysis was straightforward. Through a col-
laborative effort with several research assistants over a period of several 
years, this study analyzes every case, identified through the Westlaw data-
base, in which a Rule 408 claim was rejected by an appellate court.151 The 
study focused on rejected Rule 408 claims because this Article’s primary in-
terest was not in situations in which the promise of Rule 408 was fulfilled by 
the court, but rather where the court rejected the claim in order to ascertain 
trends, commonly accepted exceptions, and other considerations such analy-
sis may identify. 
As a result, these findings are not to be considered representative of how 
federal or state courts treat Rule 408 claims generally, nor do they provide 
any indication of insight into the frequency by which such claims are accept-
ed or rejected. Nor do they provide any insight into how a particular Rule 408 
claim might be treated by a particular court. Rather, the analysis is meant only 
to demonstrate what exceptions, limitations, and other conditions courts have 
placed on the ability to claim the confidentiality—that is, the inadmissibil-
ity—of legal negotiation evidence under Rule 408 and related state laws. 
Although all states have some form of Rule 408, states vary widely in 
terms of exceptions they recognize. Three categories of exceptions emerged: 
statutory exceptions, common law exceptions, and miscellaneous exceptions. 
B. Statutory Exceptions 
Throughout its evolution, Rule 408 has specifically enumerated some 
exceptions that have largely remained the same: “proving a witness’s bias or 
prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to ob-
                                                                                                                           
 151 Each member of the research team was given a state to analyze. They read and categorized 
each case, and then swapped cases among themselves to identify any problems in the initial cate-
gorization. The task was completed when all members of the team agreed with the meaning of the 
case and its categorization. This was not difficult in most cases, just time-consuming. 
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struct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”152 The 2006 amended version 
added another specifically enumerated exception for statements “offered in a 
criminal case,” when such claims were “related to a claim by a public office 
or agency.”153 Because nearly all states have adopted some form of Federal 
Rule 408, most states have these same statutory exceptions, many of which 
have been fleshed out by the courts. 
1. Technical Statutory Exceptions 
In addition, each of these state versions of the rule also contains excep-
tions to the general rule of inadmissibility in the form of scope limitations. 
These include limitations as to what constitutes a compromise discussion, 
which communications are about valuable consideration, how “disputed 
claims” are defined, and when a communication is offered to prove amount or 
validity. Depending upon the wording of the state rule, the general rule may 
also be limited to evidence that is not otherwise discoverable or offered to 
impeach by prior inconsistent statement.154 
These scope exceptions are significant in that they cover much of what 
goes on in today’s litigation practice—that is, discussion beyond the numbers 
of compromise and the narrow claims in dispute, as well as all conversation 
about the context in which a dispute over numbers takes place.155 
The formal “dispute” requirement provides a good example of this class 
of exceptions.156 Because Rule 408 and its state counterparts refer to evidence 
of settlement of “a disputed claim,” and evidence of attempts to settle “the 
claim,” Rule 408 claims can be rejected when a court determines there was 
no active dispute when the communication was made, or when those claims 
occur in relation to other claims or disputes.157 
                                                                                                                           
 152 FED. R. EVID. 408(b). 
 153 FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (2006) (amended 2011). 
 154 More than thirty states allow evidence of a settlement discussion to be admitted when it 
pertains to otherwise discoverable evidence. E.g., ALA. R. EVID. 408(b); ALASKA R. EVID. 408; 
DEL. R. EVID. 408; HAW. R. EVID. 408; IDAHO R. EVID. 408; KY. R. EVID. 408; LA. CODE EVID. 
ANN. art. 408 (West 2017); MD. R. EVID. 5-408(b); MICH. R. EVID. 408; MINN. R. EVID. 408; MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 2017); MONT. R. EVID. 408; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-408 (West 
2017); N.H. R. EVID. 408; N.J. R. EVID. 408; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4547 (McKinney 2017); N.C. R. 
EVID. 408; N.D. R. EVID. 408(b); OHIO R. EVID. 408; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2408 (West 
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AND STATUTES 742–44 (4th ed. 1997). 
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To illustrate, in one case parties in an employment relationship signed a 
form outlining severance pay and terms of separation.158 The form purported 
to release the employer from further related claims.159 The release form was 
admitted into evidence over a Rule 408 objection because the “claim for sev-
erance pay was not disputed” at the time the form was signed.160 
2. Bias or Prejudice 
The rationale for the bias or prejudice exception is not tied to the extrin-
sic policy rationale endorsed by Congress for Rule 408, but rather draws on 
concerns about the integrity of the proffered evidence.161 The purpose of im-
peachment by demonstrating bias or prejudice is to undermine the credibility 
of a witness.162 In the context of Rule 408, the purpose of the impeachment 
exception is to permit a party to prove that a witness said one thing during a 
compromise discussion and something different at trial, or to use compromise 
discussion statements to prove the party’s bias, motive, or lack of credibil-
ity.163 
After being revised, Rule 408 prohibits compromise discussion evidence 
from being used to provide prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of 
demonstrating that a witness is lying. But it still explicitly permits compro-
mise discussions to be used to prove bias or prejudice,164 and the cases sug-
gest the courts give the exception a broad read. In 1988, in Allen-Myland, Inc. 
v. International Business Machines Corp., decided under the 1975 rule and 
providing a straightforward example in the federal context, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff’s state-
ment made in settlement discussions, which contradicted his statement made 
at trial, was admissible.165 The plaintiff in Allen-Myland rejected defendant 
IBM’s compromise offer because it would result in only a 1.87% return and 
the proceeds would be insufficient to continue operating.166 However, at trial, 
the plaintiff testified that his company would have realized a 1.2% return and 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corp., 858 P.2d 3, 9 (Mont. 1993). 
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 161 See Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties with Their Statements During Negotia-
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that the settlement would have been “a viable business opportunity.”167 The 
court admitted the earlier statement made during compromise discussions 
because it could be used to impeach the plaintiff by prior inconsistent state-
ment.168 
Courts in nine states—Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Nebraska, Vermont, and Virginia—have recognized the bias or 
prejudice exception.169 For example, in 2001, in HealthSouth Rehabilitation 
Corp. v. Falcon Management Co., the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a 
letter constituting an offer to compromise was admissible to impeach a 
HealthSouth witness who had testified contrary to the letter’s terms.170 
Two states—Idaho and Vermont—permit bias or prejudice evidence if it 
satisfies judicial balancing. For example, in 1987, in Davidson v. Beco Corp., 
the Supreme Court of Idaho noted that although a trial judge may admit 
statements contained in settlement negotiations for the purpose of impeaching 
contrary testimony at trial, the judge may do so only if the probative value of 
such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.171 Therefore, Idaho requires 
the trial judge to engage in a two-prong analysis.172 First, a trial judge must 
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(quoting Lipschultz v. So-Jess Mgmt. Corp., 232 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967)); Miller ex 
rel. Monticello Banking Co. v. Marymount Med. Ctr., 125 S.W.3d 274, 280–82 (Ky. 2004) (con-
cluding that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion when admitting evidence of settlement for 
the purpose of impeaching witnesses’ credibility); Lund v. Holbrook, 46 N.W.2d 130, 139 (Neb. 
1951) (“Obviously, [settlement] statements made . . . should, when properly offered, be admitted 
for impeachment purposes.”), modified by Chlopek v. Schmall, 396 N.W.2d 103, 108, 110 (Neb. 
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bility of settlement evidence to attack credibility . . . .”); Anchor Co. v. Adams, 124 S.E. 438, 439 
(Va. 1924) (explaining that compromise letters admitted into evidence “were not admitted for any 
other purpose than to contradict the testimony of one of the witnesses for the defendant,” and thus 
the defendant was not prejudiced). 
 170 HealthSouth Rehab., 799 So. 2d at 187. 
 171 Davidson, 753 P.2d at 1256. 
 172 Id. 
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determine whether the evidence at issue even qualifies as a prior inconsistent 
statement.173 Second, if it does, the judge must ensure that its probative value 
outweighs it prejudicial effect.174 Vermont uses the same hybrid approach 
when applying the exception.175 
3. Criminal Exceptions 
The courts have interpreted the criminal exceptions broadly because 
these exceptions reflect the policy determination that the effective prosecution 
of criminal cases is simply more important than promoting settlement, and 
the exceptions are included in all versions of Rule 408.176 Their purpose is to 
enable statements, often made by criminal suspects or defendants, to be ad-
mitted at a criminal trial regardless of when or to whom they were made.177 
As an example on the federal side, in 1994, in United States v. Hauert, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to 
admit evidence of the defendant’s civil settlement in a tax case.178 The de-
fendant was convicted of tax evasion and appealed his conviction in part on 
the ground that the government wrongly introduced evidence of a 1984 civil 
settlement with the Internal Revenue Service.179 This evidence included the 
defendant’s statements and conduct that supported his civil case but contra-
dicted his “good faith” defense at his criminal trial.180 The court allowed the 
evidence pursuant to the 1975 version’s “another purpose” clause.181 
Most states also permit the introduction of compromise negotiation evi-
dence in criminal cases. Again, there is some variation as to scope. At least 
forty-one states follow the federal rule explicitly allowing evidence of a set-
tlement discussion to be admitted when the evidence proves an effort to com-
promise or obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.182 California 
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permits the evidence to prove an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation, so 
long as there is a limiting instruction.183 Missouri and New Jersey courts have 
tied this exception to statutes that are more context-specific than the general 
statutes of other states, permitting offers of payment or restitution to a victim 
in exchange for dropping criminal charges, even absent an express admission 
of guilt.184 
This exception has been interpreted broadly. For example, in 1975, in 
State v. Tash, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that an offer of compro-
mise made to avoid criminal charges is admissible even without an express 
admission of guilt.185 After being apprehended by officers for the theft of a 
coonhound, the defendant told the owner of the dog that he would pay four 
hundred dollars in order to avoid prosecution for the theft.186 Ultimately, the 
court admitted the dog owner’s testimony that the defendant made the offer 
because it was an attempt to avoid criminal charges.187 
C. Common Law Exceptions 
Federal and state courts have been willing to carve out their own excep-
tions to Rule 408 as well. Many of these exceptions center on the reason for 
proffering the evidence rather than the nature of the evidence itself.188 Most 
jurisdictions recognize multiple common law exceptions, but there is consid-
erable inconsistency between jurisdictions as to which common law excep-
tions have been adopted. The federal courts tend to be more consistent, but 
that is only relative to the states. 
An analysis of the cases powerfully demonstrates the combined effect of 
vestigial rationales for Rule 408—especially relevance—that remain good 
precedents in the case law, even though they do not reflect the rationale cho-
sen by Congress. Pursuant to the fundamental tension, judges have often felt 
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 186 Id. at 779. 
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an obligation to provide the litigants before them with access to the evidence 
they need to prove their cases and draw on Rule 408 cases decided on older 
rationales to admit compromise discussion evidence, even when it is incon-
sistent with the extrinsic policy rationale adopted by Congress.189 
The primary common law exceptions found include proof of state of 
mind, proof of independent facts, otherwise discoverable evidence, mutuality 
of concessions, and attorney’s fees. 
1. Proof of State of Mind or Knowledge 
This judicial exception permits the admission of compromise discussion 
evidence to establish the intent of a party, terms of a contract, or an admission 
of liability.190 This exception is not rooted in the extrinsic policy rationale 
Congress adopted for Rule 408, but rather is borrowed from the law of rele-
vance—in particular, the so-called “state of mind” exception to the hearsay 
rule.191 In that context, this exception permits the admission of hearsay evi-
dence of a declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or 
plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, 
pain, or bodily health) because, as the declarant’s own statement, it is likely to 
be sufficiently trustworthy to permit a jury to hear it.192 A showing of necessi-
ty is also required.193 
This exception is well-developed at the federal level. For example, in 
1996, in In re Portnoy, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York held that a debtor’s statements during a settlement nego-
tiation were admissible in evidence to show the debtor’s intent.194 The debtor 
had made certain statements during settlement attempts, including statements 
about his allegedly low monthly salary and his total lack of assets other than 
real estate.195 Over the debtor’s objections, these statements were introduced 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Although this may sound like a harsh critique of the courts, it is not intended as such. Ra-
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by creditors to show Portnoy’s state of mind, namely that he was attempting 
to dishonestly hide assets from the creditors.196 
Nearly a dozen states—Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Wisconsin—also 
allow evidence of a settlement discussion to be admitted when it is offered to 
prove state of mind or the prior knowledge of a party.197 These courts have 
applied the exception broadly, using the exception, for example, to admit 
compromise discussion statements that reflect “tacit admission[s] of liabil-
ity,”198 terms of an unclear agreement,199 and statements determining the in-
tent of the parties.200 Similarly, in 1958, in York v. Chandler, the Court of Ap-
peals of Alabama held that an admission of liability could be inferred by the 
jury from the appellant’s statement to the appellee about obtaining estimates 
from an automobile accident and admitted the compromise discussion evi-
dence.201 
On the other hand, at least one court—the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court—requires a balancing analysis to determine whether to admit evi-
dence of settlement discussions.202 That court upheld an admission of com-
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promise discussion statements into evidence where the trial court had “care-
fully weighed the benefits and potential prejudice” and concluded that such 
evidence was properly admitted to demonstrate the defendant’s state of 
mind.203 The court below also attempted to diminish the prejudicial impact of 
the evidence without revealing the settlement negotiations by prescribing 
special jury instructions.204 These instructions informed the jury that state-
ments made during discussions could not be automatically considered to be 
unconditional statements as a matter of law.205 
2. Proof of Independent Facts 
This exception is one of two that reflect historical concerns about ex-
cluding evidence that would be admissible but for the settlement discussion; 
the other is the exception for otherwise discoverable facts, discussed further 
below.206 Like the state of mind exception, the independent facts exception 
appears to be borrowed from the law of relevance—specifically, again, the 
hearsay rule207—rather than the extrinsic policy rationale chosen by Congress 
for Rule 408. 
The proof of independent facts exception permits the admissibility of 
any fact—for example, the street was wet—that can be proved with evidence 
other than statements made during settlement discussions, such as through 
eyewitness testimony.208 For example, in 1983, in Vulcan Hart Corp. v. 
NLRB, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that facts pertaining to a 
compromise discussion were admissible as independent facts.209 In Vulcan 
Hart Corp., a dispute arose over Vulcan’s practices during a strike.210 Before 
the strike, Vulcan and its workers had entered into several collective bargain-
ing agreements.211 After the breakdown of discussions, the union filed a peti-
tion with the National Labor Relations Board and later won a judgment in 
district court from which Vulcan appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit.212 Among the issues at trial was Vulcan’s attempt to force 
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a union leader out of his position.213 In the subsequent actions, certain find-
ings of fact were admitted over Vulcan’s objections because those findings 
resulted from “reinstatement” discussions.214 The Eighth Circuit acknowl-
edged that the reinstatement negotiations could be considered compromise 
discussions.215 It allowed the facts to be admitted, however, because they 
were merely “an independent admission of fact[s]” and thus within the “an-
other purpose” exception of Rule 408.216 
At least twenty-one states—Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin—and the District of Columbia 
admit evidence of a settlement discussion when it is offered to prove an inde-
pendent fact.217 This exception is not heavily litigated in the states that recog-
nize it; the majority of cases are from 1994 or earlier.218 
3. Otherwise Discoverable Evidence 
This exception is similar to the independent facts exception but differs in 
the nature of the evidence it admits. The independent facts exception applies 
to facts introduced into a compromise discussion that may also be gathered 
outside the compromise discussion.219 In contrast, the otherwise discoverable 
evidence exception focuses on other types of evidence that would be discov-
erable but for the fact it was disclosed during the compromise discussion. 
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Again, the exception does not derive from the extrinsic policy rationale for 
Rule 408, but, rather, it is borrowed from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) 26, which requires litigants to produce in discovery documents that 
are “otherwise discoverable.” 
As with Rule 26, the purpose of the exception in the Rule 408 context is 
to prevent parties from hiding evidence in compromise discussions—that is, 
using the compromise discussion to shield from admissibility evidence that 
would have been discoverable but for the fact that it was produced in the 
compromise discussion.220 Thus, a tax return given by a defendant to the 
plaintiff would be an otherwise discoverable document subject to admission 
under this exception, while a list of costs associated with a dispute and pre-
pared for the settlement would not. 
The otherwise discoverable evidence exception is so broadly accepted 
by the federal courts that the Advisory Committee removed it from Rule 408 
in 2006, contending that the case law had rendered the provision “superflu-
ous.”221 As a result, most of the recent litigation over this exception relates to 
attempts to prevent the disclosure of damaging evidence during the discovery 
process—because most courts, and, implicitly, most parties, recognize that 
once such evidence is disclosed, it will likely be admissible.222 
At least thirty states—Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia—have adopted the 
otherwise discoverable exception, either by statute or through common law, 
in an attempt to conform their evidentiary rules to the 1975 federal codifica-
tion.223 
                                                                                                                           
 220 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See, e.g., Phoenix Sols. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 254 F.R.D. 568, 585 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(recognizing the advisory committee’s rationale and the general principle behind the rule). 
 223 See FED. R. EVID. 408; ALA. R. EVID. 408(b); ALASKA R. EVID. 408; DEL. R. EVID. 408; 
HAW. R. EVID. 408; IDAHO R. EVID. 408; IOWA R. EVID. 5.408; KY. R. EVID. 408; LA. CODE 
EVID. ANN. art. 408 (West 2017); MD. R. EVID. 5-408(b); MICH. R. EVID. 408; MINN. R. EVID. 
408; MISS. R. EVID. 408(b); MO. STAT. ANN. § 435.014 (West 2017); MONT. R. EVID. 408; NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 27-408 (West 2017); N.H. R. EVID. 408; N.J. R. EVID. 408; N.M. R. EVID. 11-408; 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4547 (McKinney 2017); N.C. R. EVID. 408; N.D. R. EVID. 408(b); OHIO R. EVID. 
408; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2408 (West 2017); PA. R. EVID. 408(b); R.I. R. EVID. 408; S.C. 
R. EVID. 408; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-408 (2017); TENN. R. EVID. 408; TEX. R. EVID. 408; 
UTAH R. EVID. 408(b); VT. R. EVID. 408; WASH. R. EVID. 408; W. VA. R. EVID. 408(b). Although 
this exception can be found directly within many state statutes, it is highly likely that all states 
recognize this exception even if their statute is otherwise silent. 
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4. Mutuality of Concessions 
Though the independent facts and otherwise discoverable exceptions are 
both common and familiar, several states have developed the more novel re-
quirement that the compromise discussion evidence entail mutual concessions 
for the general rule of compromise discussion inadmissibility to apply. At 
least seventeen states now recognize this exception, including California, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, 
and West Virginia.224 
In 1970, in Moving Picture Machine Operators Union v. Glasgow Thea-
ters, Inc., a California Court of Appeals discussed the mutuality of conces-
sions exception, and provides an example of how this exception operates.225 
In that case, the defendant’s attorney mailed a letter to the plaintiff.226 The 
letter indicated that the defendant owed the plaintiff a sum of money and of-
fered to pay the full amount in order to settle the dispute.227 After the plaintiff 
rejected the offer, the defendant attempted to exclude the letter from being 
admitted as evidence on the grounds that it was an inadmissible offer of com-
promise.228 The threshold question for the California Court of Appeal was 
whether the letter was made “in contemplation of mutual concessions . . . .”229 
In its analysis, the court explicitly stated that a compromise does not exist 
where the party intends to “secure relief against . . . liability” or if “the party 
making the proposal . . . intended to make no concessions but to exact all that 
he deemed himself entitled to . . . .”230 
                                                                                                                           
 224 Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union Local No. 162 v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc., 86 Cal. 
Rptr. 33, 37–38 (Ct. App. 1970); Pac. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 73 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1952); Sylvester v. Animal Emergency Clinic of Oahu, 825 P.2d 1053, 1056–57 (Haw. 
1992); Collection Prof’ls, Inc. v. Logan, 695 N.E.2d 1344, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Forker v. 
Berkes, 38 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1941); Hines v. Thomas Jefferson Fire Ins. Co., 267 
S.W.2d 709, 711 (Ky. 1953); Thirlby v. Mandeloff, 90 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Mich. 1958); In re 
Buckmaster, 755 N.W.2d 570, 577–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); Maugh v. Chrysler Corp., 818 
S.W.2d 658, 660–61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Morris DeLee Family Trust v. Cost Reduction Eng’g, 
Inc., 705 P.2d 161, 163 (Nev. 1985); Russell v. Bennett, 617 P.2d 877, 878 (Okla. 1980); Dalk v. 
Lachmund, 70 P.2d 558, 560 (Or. 1937); Rochester Mach. Corp. v. Mulach Steel Corp., 449 A.2d 
1366, 1368 (Pa. 1982); Lambert v. Cate, No. 03A01-9404-CV-00120, 1994 WL 669511, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1994); In re In the Interest of J— T— H—, 630 S.W.2d 473, 477–78 
(Tex. App. 1982); Newsom v. Miller, 258 P.2d 812, 814 (Wash. 1953); LOUIS J. PALMER, JR. ET 
AL., HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 408.03 (6th ed. 2017), Lexis. 
 225 Glasgow Theaters, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 36–38. 
 226 Id. at 36. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 37 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 230 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The rationale for this exception arises from the definition of compro-
mise.231 All of the adopting states use language similar to American Jurispru-
dence’s analysis of whether a valid compromise exists: “A compromise or 
settlement is supported by good consideration if it is based upon a disputed or 
unliquidated claim, and the parties make or promise mutual concessions as a 
means of terminating the dispute[] . . . .”232 For example, the Hawaii and Illi-
nois courts define a compromise as “an agreement to terminate, by means of 
mutual concessions, a claim which is disputed in good faith or unliquidat-
ed.”233 By adopting this definition, these states are giving arguably the nar-
rowest possible interpretation of the general rule of inadmissibility. 
The trend in states requiring this threshold inquiry is to use a definition 
of “compromise” to determine whether the exclusionary rule for compromise 
discussions applies.234 In effect, the insistence that each side must make con-
cessions during the settlement discussions becomes an additional requirement 
for invoking this rule.235 As a result, calling this doctrine an exception is a bit 
of a misnomer in that courts treat it more like a predicate requirement. That is 
to say, if the evidence does not prove that mutual concessions were made, the 
court will go no further with its analysis and will conclude that the exclusion-
ary rule does not apply because, by definition, no compromise had been 
made. Thus, in 1991, in Maugh v. Chrysler Corp., the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals found that a car manufacturer’s newspaper ad offering to replace certain 
vehicles was not an offer to compromise because the advertisement did not 
invoke mutual concessions.236 As a result, the exhibit of the newspaper ad 
was admissible in court.237 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See Compromise, supra note 22. 
 232 15B ANNE KNICKERBOCKER, AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 20, Westlaw 
(database updated Feb. 2018) (footnotes omitted); see supra note 224 and accompanying text 
(listing states that have adopted this language). 
 233 E.g., Sylvester v. Animal Emergency Clinic of Oahu, 825 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Haw. 1992) 
(footnote omitted); Collection Prof’ls, Inc. v. Logan, 695 N.E.2d 1344, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 234 See Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union Local No. 162 v. Glasgow Theaters, Inc., 86 
Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (Ct. App. 1970) (defining compromise as requiring the existence of mutual con-
cessions); Logan, 695 N.E.2d at 1348 (“A compromise is an agreement to terminate, by means of 
mutual concessions, a claim which is disputed in good faith . . . .”); Forker v. Berkes, 38 N.E.2d 
296, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1941) (holding that an “instrument, as to the release of claims, [that] did 
not disclose any settlement as to compromise of such claims by mutual concession[s]” was not a 
compromise); Thirlby v. Mandeloff, 90 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Mich. 1958) (finding that the “notion of 
mutual concession is implicit” in a compromise). 
 235 See, e.g., Maugh v. Chrysler Corp., 818 S.W.2d 658, 660–61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (provid-
ing an example of a compromise that was held to be invalid due to a lack of mutual concessions 
by each party). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id.  
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D. Miscellaneous Exceptions 
1. Attorney’s Fees 
Two federal courts have begun to recognize an exception for attorney’s 
fees in order to simplify the process of determining the correct amount of 
such fees to be distributed after a case has been resolved. Specifically, these 
courts admit total amounts of individual settlement offers to better determine 
the value of the action and more intelligently calculate attorney’s fees. 
Currently, only the Third and Ninth Circuits have recognized attorney’s 
fees as an exception to Rule 408. To illustrate, in 2009, in Lohman v. Duryea 
Borough, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence relating to 
settlement negotiations could be admissible to determine the amount of attor-
ney’s fees.238 In Lohman, petitioner Lohman prevailed at jury trial only to 
have his total award reduced by the trial court.239 In making this reduction, 
the trial court relied, in part, on the fact that Lohman rejected a settlement 
offer of $75,000.240 Although Lohman argued that permitting the settlement 
discussion evidence to reduce the attorney’s fee award would negatively im-
pact the attorney’s ability to negotiate, the court disagreed.241 In fact, the court 
suggested that admitting this evidence would improve the settlement pro-
cess.242 In 2011, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on Lohman in reaching a sim-
ilar result in Ingram v. Oroudjian.243 
2. Jurisdiction 
Finally, a small but growing number of federal courts consider the con-
tent of settlement discussions in order to determine if the parties have, or can, 
satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 
In 2003, in Archer v. Kelly, the Northern District of Oklahoma held 
that statements made by the plaintiff during compromise discussions would 
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.244 The plaintiff had issued a 
“demand letter” to all of the defendants and offered to settle the case for 
                                                                                                                           
 238 574 F.3d 163, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 239 Id. at 165–66 (“The jury found for Lohman on one of the three claims . . . . Lohman 
moved for attorney’s fees and costs . . . . The Court calculated a lodestar of $62,986.75, but con-
cluded that the award should be reduced for limited success.”). 
 240 Id. at 165. 
 241 Id. at 168. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In Lohman, the defendants made 
three settlement offers after the trial began . . . . The plaintiff rejected the offers and was awarded 
$12,205 by the jury. . . . When considering the plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, the district 
court reduced the lodestar from $62,986.75 to $30,000 based on the plaintiff’s limited success.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 244 271 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1324 (N.D. Okla. 2003). 
566 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:523 
$1,000,000.245 The complaint, however, sought $10,000.246 After refusing 
the settlement offer, one defendant sought removal to federal court, in part on 
the basis of the $1,000,000 claim.247 The court received the demand letter into 
evidence because “the situations mentioned in the rule are ‘illustrative’ and 
[do] not foreclose offering ‘compromise’ evidence for other purposes.”248 
In 2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied that reasoning to 
similar facts in Carroll v. Stryker Corp.249 In Carroll, the plaintiff’s counsel 
sent an e-mail reducing the plaintiff’s initial offer from at least $100,000 to 
$60,000 “plus certain nonmonetary relief.”250 Citing prior Circuit precedent, 
the Seventh Circuit held that the e-mailed settlement discussion evidence was 
admissible for purposes of considering removal251 and allowed the case to 
proceed in federal court.252 The Ninth253 and Tenth254 Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal have used similar reasoning to admit settlement discussion evidence for 
purposes of removal. 
On the other hand, at least one federal court has ruled that admitting set-
tlement discussion evidence in order to establish minimum contacts to estab-
lish personal jurisdiction would “contravene the [public] policy” undergirding 
the settlement discussion rule.255 
E. Synthesis and Conclusion: A Porous Rule 
Despite Rule 408’s promise of inadmissibility, the text of Rule 408 was 
drafted narrowly to exempt only compromise discussions rather than the en-
tirety of the legal negotiations process, and how it evolved in subsequent re-
drafts from a rule of presumptive inadmissibility to a rule of presumptive ad-
                                                                                                                           
 245 Id. at 1323. 
 246 Id. at 1321–22. 
 247 Id. at 1322–23. 
 248 Id. at 1323. 
 249 658 F.3d 675, 681–82 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 250 Id. at 681. 
 251 Id. at 682. 
 252 Id. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, for purposes of removing a case to federal court, the 
removing party “ha[d] established that what the plaintiff hopes to get out of the litigation[] . . . was 
well over $75,000.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253 See, e.g., Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming removal in a 
trademark infringement suit in which the settlement letter “show[ed] that [the plaintiff] value[d] 
his trademark rights—the object of the litigation—as worth more than $100,000”). 
 254 See, e.g., McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 956–57 (10th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that 
“documents that demonstrate plaintiff’s own estimation of its claim are a proper means of support-
ing . . . removal” in finding “several emails and letters that show[ed] . . . the value of the claim” 
sufficient). 
 255 Mesa Airlines, Inc. v. Uslan, No. CV07-00178-PHX-JAT, 2007 WL 1821298, at *2 (D. 
Ariz. June 25, 2007) (noting, however, that Rule 408 does not expressly disallow use of such evi-
dence) (citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
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missibility.256 Additionally, the great variation in similar rules in the states 
that were intended to conform to federal law have actually become more at 
odds with the federal rule as the rule itself has evolved. 
Further, the foregoing Part analyzes how the federal and state courts 
treat those rules, only to find that they have carved out many exceptions to 
Rule 408’s general rule of inadmissibility.257 Some of these exceptions are the 
results of the rule’s bizarre and complex textual language, such as the re-
quirement of mutuality of concessions recognized by some courts. Others are 
due to the policy choice that the need for compromise discussion evidence in 
certain types of cases outweighs the general policy barring their admissibility, 
such as the broad read courts give the criminal exceptions. A few have 
emerged to prevent abuse, such as the exceptions for proof of independent 
facts and otherwise discoverable evidence. Finally, other exceptions have 
simply been drawn from the dustbins of history, providing justifications for 
departures from that general rule of inadmissibility—even though they have 
been superseded by Congress’s singular embrace of the extrinsic policy ra-
tionale for Rule 408 as a vehicle to promote settlement through the creation 
of a safe space in which those discussions occur. 
Taken together, the textual and doctrinal analysis uncovers a thick, 
thorny bramble bush of law worthy of Karl Llewellyn’s sobering appella-
tion.258 As illustrated in the next Part, this is particularly troubling, given the 
changing nature of legal negotiations and law practice more generally.259  
III. THE CHANGED ENVIRONMENT OF LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS 
At the same time as the federal and state rules have become more per-
missive in admitting legal negotiations evidence, the practice of legal negotia-
tion has become more open to disclosure of sensitive information. Indeed, the 
basic model of legal negotiation has changed fundamentally since the adop-
tion of Rule 408 in 1975, at least as taught in U.S. law schools. 
A. The Paradigm Shift in Legal Negotiation 
The emergence of modern negotiation as the primary means by which 
legal disputes are resolved has profound implications for Rule 408, several of 
which are discussed below. 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See supra notes 22–150 and accompanying text. 
 257 See supra notes 151–255 and accompanying text. 
 258 See generally K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (2d ed. 1951) (providing an intro-
duction to the study of law). 
 259 See infra notes 260–302 and accompanying text. 
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1. From Positions to Interests 
To be sure, negotiation has always been a part of the litigation land-
scape.260 The legal negotiations of today, however, are far different from the 
legal negotiations for which the compromise discussion rule was drafted in 
1975. Indeed, at that time, legal negotiation was viewed as a strictly adversar-
ial process, in which the negotiators used whatever leverage they had to try to 
win the negotiation in the zealous representation of their clients.261 The par-
ties would state their positions, defend them with law and facts, and try to 
convince the other side that their own position was right, or, at minimum, that 
the other side was wrong.262 Disclosure was minimal and guarded, and nego-
tiation technique largely consisted of tricks like extreme bargaining positions, 
“take it or leave it” offers, tightly scaled concession patterns, and unvarnished 
intimidation.263 This approach to negotiation emphasized the positions of the 
parties, and is often called positional, adversarial, or distributive bargain-
ing.264 
This began to change in the mid-1970s, when two Harvard Law School 
professors began what has become the modern Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion movement (the “ADR movement”). First, in 1976, Professor Frank E.A. 
Sander gave a speech to an important legal conference hosted by Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger that came to be known as the Pound Conference.265 The 
speech called for different ways of resolving legal disputes besides trial, in-
cluding mediation, which like negotiation is a consensual process rather than 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 14, at 1340 (recognizing that our judicial system has 
long encouraged settlement through negotiation). 
 261 For a general discussion of what she termed the “traditional adversarial” model of negotia-
tion, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 762–83 (1984). 
 262 See Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325, 
342–43 (describing strategy and techniques employed in the “competitive bargaining” process). 
 263 See id. at 349–57 (presenting a multitude of negotiation techniques for use by practition-
ers). 
 264 Alternative dispute resolution commentators and practitioners disagree over the name best 
attributed to this negotiation approach. For an example of use of the term “adversarial” negotia-
tion, see RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 28, at 149–50. For an example of use of the phrase 
“positional bargaining,” see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN passim (Bruce Patton ed., 3d ed. 2011). For an example of a use 
of the phrase “[d]istributive negotiation[],” see DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAG-
ER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 141 (1986). 
 265 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PER-
SPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). The 
conference derived its name from the conclave it was modeled after, Harvard Law School Dean 
Roscoe Pound’s turn-of-the-century Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice. See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 83, 134 (1976). 
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an adversarial one.266 Sander’s speech is widely credited with planting the 
seeds of the modern ADR movement. 
Negotiation was a key part of this revolution. In 1981, a colleague of 
Sander’s at Harvard Law School, Professor Roger Fisher, together with a stu-
dent of his, William Ury, wrote the seminal work on modern negotiation: Get-
ting to Yes.267 It was an immensely popular book, written for lay audiences—
without a single footnote—and offered a different approach to negotiation 
than the traditional adversarial model.268 
Fisher and Ury called the approach “principled negotiation,” and en-
couraged negotiators to abandon the traditional positional bargaining of the 
past and instead focus on their underlying interests, concerns, beliefs, and 
preferences, and then work toward a mutually satisfying settlement of the 
dispute based on those interests.269 Eschewing the grudging disclosure of po-
sitional bargaining, principled negotiation was a high disclosure model be-
cause the information necessary for agreement—the underlying interests, 
concerns, and preferences of the parties—generally would not be known 
without affirmative party disclosure.270 Two decades later, Harvard Law Pro-
fessor Robert H. Mnookin and his co-authors pushed this concept a step fur-
ther by demonstrating how negotiators could create additional value for both 
                                                                                                                           
 266 See Sander, supra note 265, at 68–72 (presenting a range of available alternatives for re-
solving legal disputes outside of adjudication). 
 267 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 1st ed. 1981). For 
another highly influential approach to dispute resolution, which considers the intellectual, philo-
sophical, and practical differences among parties, see generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 261. 
 268 In all fairness, Getting to Yes was not the first work to suggest this approach to negotia-
tion. See, e.g., RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LA-
BOR NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM 144–48 (1st ed.1965) 
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 269 See FISHER & URY, supra note 264, at 12–15. Other important works include, in chrono-
logical order: DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART 
AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 261 (published in 1984); 
JEANNE M. BRETT ET AL., THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR AND DISPUTE RESOLVER (Robert M. 
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(Kenneth J. Arrow et al., eds., 1995); DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW 
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(Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR AD-
VANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006). 
 270 FISHER & URY, supra note 264, at 51. 
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parties by taking advantage of “potential sources of value creation,” such as 
differences in risk preferences and economies of scale.271 
Although the revolution in negotiation theory would be slow to come to 
the practice community, and is still underway in many respects, the influence 
of Fisher’s approach in Getting to Yes is beyond question. Since the book’s 
publication, hundreds of thousands of experts in law, business, and other pro-
fessions from across the world have been trained in some variation of what has 
come to be known generally as “interest-based”272 or “problem-solving”273 
negotiation.274 Today, nearly every law school and business school offers at 
least part of a course in negotiation and uses the interest-based model as the 
primary mode of instruction.275 Interest-based negotiation has become so 
deeply engrained in modern legal culture that there is even a movement in the 
practice community toward “collaborative law,” especially in the family are-
na, where the commitment to interest-based settlement is so strong that par-
ties contract for full disclosure and the attorneys agree to withdraw if they 
cannot resolve the matter.276 
Due in part to these changes, the number of legal cases decided by a 
court or a jury has dropped dramatically, “from 11.5[%] . . . in 1962” to 1.8% 
in 2002.277 In his landmark study, Professor Marc Galanter famously termed 
this phenomenon “the vanishing trial.”278 According to Galanter, although 
there are many possible reasons for the increasing scarcity of trials, the rising 
popularity of interest-based negotiation is clearly one of them.279 
                                                                                                                           
 271 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 14–16. 
 272 See id. at 240 (“Negotiating at the Interest-Based Table”). 
 273 Id. at 12. 
 274 For example, Karrass, one of the most prominent commercial providers of negotiation 
training, promotes alternative types of negotiation. See Seminars, KARRASS, http://www.karrass.
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 275 See, e.g., Search the ABA Directory, UNIV. OR. SCH. LAW, https://law.uoregon.edu/01/
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 278 Id. at 515. 
 279 See id. at 514 (“One of the most prominent explanations of the decline of trials is the mi-
gration of cases to other forums.”). 
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2. From Less Disclosure to More Disclosure 
As shown in Part II, Rule 408 and its state progeny were written and 
adopted before the advent of interest-based negotiation, mediation, and other 
consensual processes, at a time when legal negotiations and settlements were 
dominated by the adversarial model.280 Given a model where disclosure is 
guarded and outcomes are narrowly focused on a dollar amount, it makes 
sense to have a rule that protects only the specific negotiation over the dollar 
amount—that is, the compromise discussion. There is no need to protect the 
surrounding discussions because the parties’ lawyers already are safeguarding 
information they want to keep away from their adversaries. In this model, it 
would be unfair to make the actual compromise discussions subject to later 
discovery and admissibility because of the possibility of exploitation of the 
compromising party’s willingness to reduce their demand to settle the mat-
ter.281 In this environment, the Rule 408 of 1975 is entirely proper as a rule of 
evidentiary exclusion because it is narrowly tailored to bar from admissibility 
just the evidence that is necessary to facilitate the compromise. 
But this is not today’s negotiation environment, at least not with the di-
rection it is heading. Rather than being guarded, attorneys and parties are en-
couraged to disclose more freely information about their interests, concerns, 
preferences, and anything else that may be remotely relevant to the controver-
sy.282 Armed with this information, the attorneys can work together to brain-
storm different ways of resolving the problem before settling on a particular 
course of action. Solutions are often highly integrated with non-economic 
components, such as apologies, restructured relationships, or even new and 
expanded opportunities.283 
In this model, the dollar amount for which the parties ultimately settle 
may be the least significant aspect of the final settlement. For example, attor-
neys in an interest-based negotiation may find that a dispute over how much 
A owes B in the dissolution of a partnership is much more about their rela-
tionship—such as lack of appreciation, unclear lines of authority and auton-
omy, or an unworkable business structure284—than it is about an amount in 
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dispute. Indeed, in such a negotiation it is entirely possible that the matter will 
settle without any value exchange whatsoever, even though that is what the 
parties were originally pursuing. 
Most judges and lawyers would probably agree that this kind of settle-
ment is good for the legal system, just as it is for the parties. The parties are 
able to conclude their matter without the need for judicial resources—and 
with an arguably better result—thereby conserving judicial resources for ex-
ceptional cases that require judicial resolution. Most lawyers and judges 
would also likely agree that the law should promote this kind of discussion by 
barring the admission of evidence from those discussions, because the ex-
change of information in those discussions is necessary to achieve an inte-
grated result. They would also probably be surprised and dismayed, however, 
to learn that most of the legal negotiations leading to this outcome were fully 
subject to disclosure and admissibility because Rule 408 and its state progeny 
cover only the compromise of valuable consideration, and, even then, are sub-
ject to the many exceptions and other limitations identified in Part II.285 
B. The Shift in the Structure of Legal Negotiation 
The foregoing dynamic is made exponentially worse given the changes 
in the structure of legal negotiations since Rule 408 was first enacted in 1975. 
1. From Face-to-Face to Texts and Social Media 
When Rule 408 was enacted in 1975, most legal negotiations were face-
to-face encounters. They were literally held between the lawyers, and some-
times clients, in a law firm conference room. Such face-to-face negotiations 
may have been, and often were, supplemented by letters, phone calls, and 
maybe an occasional teletype. This was the technology of the time, but it gave 
the process a certain formality that complemented the dominant adversarial 
model of negotiation. Legal negotiations were generally confined to a specific 
format and topic—distribution of value—and the spatial boundaries of the 
negotiation were clear. 
This is still true today, but to a much lesser extent given the changing 
nature of technology. There are still be lawyer letters and meetings, but there 
are also texts, e-mails, and, in some cases, blog posts and other forms of so-
cial media persuasion. For example, lawyers today frequently use texts as a 
means of back-channel communication with their counter-parts—before, dur-
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ing, and after the negotiation—as well as with others who may have infor-
mation that may become immediately pertinent in a negotiation. 
Lawyers, of course, will approach such communications in the context 
of a specific negotiation with care and diligence. But changes in communica-
tions force us to expand our understanding of when legal negotiation is taking 
place—especially for purposes of applying Rule 408 and related state laws—
and to consider how a protective rule of confidentiality needs to apply more 
broadly than to simply compromise discussions over value. 
2. From Judges to Facilitators of Settlement 
Structural changes affecting negotiation can be seen inside the court-
house as well, as judges have increasingly become involved in the negotiation 
process. FRCP 16 is an important driver of this phenomenon because it ex-
pressly authorizes federal judges to hold pretrial conferences for the purposes 
of “facilitating settlement.”286 
A related factor has been the judicial embrace of mediation. As noted 
above, the rise of the modern ADR movement—arguably the most significant 
development in civil litigation since the liberalization of federal discovery 
rules in 1938—came after the promulgation of Rule 408 in 1975.287 As ADR 
has evolved,288 mediation has become the most significant of the alternative 
processes—especially in courts.289 It is a consensual process and therefore 
does not raise the kinds of constitutional questions posed by judicially com-
pelled arbitration.290 Judges appreciate the ability of mediation to provide for 
better and more flexible outcomes, as well as for outcomes that are more du-
rable and less likely to be the subject of appeal. As a result, most federal and 
state courts have instituted mediation programs, often at both the trial and 
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appellate level.291 Sometimes these programs are voluntary, but more often 
they are mandatory for particular cases, either by legislation or court rule.292 
Judicial acceptance of mediation is a salutary development for the par-
ties and the courts, but it is complicated for purposes of understanding the 
legal confidentiality of the proceedings. Historically, there have been a wide 
variety of mediation programs in the courts.293 But with court funding declin-
ing at both the state and the federal levels, courts have fewer funds for em-
ployees whose primary responsibility is the mediation of litigated cases.294 
The private bar is able to help pick up some of this slack through pro bono 
roster programs, but, often, the rest is picked up by the judges themselves 
under the rubric of FRCP 16 settlement conferences.295 
Thus, the question arises: are these judicial proceedings settlement con-
ferences or mediations for purposes of their confidentiality? Some judges 
admit that they are not sure.296 Clearly, the judges are facilitating settlement 
in a manner consistent with mediation. But, as a formal matter, the proceed-
ing is a Rule 16 settlement conference. The difference is crucial for purposes 
of the confidentiality of the proceedings because the law treats settlement 
conferences differently than mediations. 
If they are deemed settlement conferences, then Rule 408 applies, and 
there is very little protection against the subsequent admissibility of state-
ments made in the course of the settlement, as shown in Parts II and III 
above.297 On the other hand, if they are deemed mediations, they would be 
covered by that jurisdiction’s mediation confidentiality rules. Yet even that 
provides little comfort. As the drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act 
(“UMA”) found, there are more than 250 different state mediation confidenti-
ality laws.298 Some states’ mediation confidentiality laws apply to all media-
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tions, but many other states offer confidentiality protections only to media-
tions of certain types under that state’s governing statute or court rule.299 
The drafters also found that the “privilege structure” is the most com-
mon form of protection for mediation communications, regardless of whether 
the mediation confidentiality protection is found in a rule that applies to all 
mediations or just specific types of mediations.300 The UMA was drafted in 
part to correct this problem, but even then it has been adopted in only about a 
dozen jurisdictions.301 Although this is actually good from the perspective of 
the history of state passage of uniform laws,302 that is little comfort to parties 
in non-UMA states. For them, the law is unclear. Their communications could 
be treated as settlement discussions, in which case they are often inadmissible 
for the reasons previously discussed. Or they could be treated as mediations, 
which, under state law, may not be confidential at all.303 
C. An Anachronism Emerges 
Rule 408 was born into a culture of legal negotiation that was largely 
positional and adversarial, but now finds itself an anachronism in a legal cul-
ture continuing to evolve toward a more open and interest-based norm of le-
gal negotiation. 
Like a square peg and a round hole, the fit is no longer there between the 
rule and the situation to which it is applied. With the benefit of research, ex-
perience, and hindsight, it is time to pivot to the future and reconstruct the 
rule so that it more effectively meets the needs of the present and emerging 
legal environment. 
The following Part proposes that this can be accomplished simply by el-
evating the current Rule 408 from the quasi-privilege that the Advisory 
Committee drafted in 1975 to the full privilege that Congress intended when 
it grounded the rule in the extrinsic policy of encouraging the private settle-
ment of legal disputes.304 
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IV. RETHINKING RULE 408 AND RELATED STATE LAWS 
A. A Perfect Storm 
Congress enacted Rule 408 in 1975 for reasons of extrinsic policy—to 
foster the private settlement of legal disputes by assuring that communica-
tions made during those discussions are not later held against the speaker in a 
court of law.305 This is one time that Congress may have actually been presci-
ent and ahead of its time, as the significance of the rule, and the rationale it 
deliberately chose among competing options, has become more important and 
relevant with the rise of interest-based negotiation and other consensual dis-
pute resolution processes. 
As drafted, amended, and judicially interpreted, however, the rule is far 
too narrow to meet that goal in the modern practice of law.306  
This is especially problematic given the movement in legal negotiation 
away from the grudging release of information that historically characterized 
the positional bargaining anticipated by Rule 408 and toward a more modern, 
interest-based model resulting in disclosure of more and more information. 
Unfortunately, this is the very kind of information that an aggressive lawyer 
might seek if he or she thought it was potentially available.307 
The net effect of this confluence of dynamics is a perfect storm that pos-
es a grave threat to one of the most significant components of the U.S. legal 
system: the settlement of civil cases. As more practicing lawyers realize just 
how limited Rule 408’s protections actually are, it is reasonable to expect that 
they will begin to take advantage of the opportunities the rule creates, as re-
vised and interpreted, to gain access to legal negotiation evidence previously 
believed to be protected by the compromise discussion rule. They will be able 
to do this in their own cases, as well as by intervening in other cases with 
similar parties or issues that could yield or prevent the production of helpful 
evidence for their own cases. 
The changing nature of legal negotiation gives attorneys every incentive 
to be aggressive in pursuit of compromise discussion evidence because the 
interest-based model of negotiation encourages the disclosure of more and 
more information about the parties’ interests, needs, concerns, preferences, 
and other underlying issues. This disclosure could be devastating to the dis-
closing party if the negotiation fails and the legal negotiation evidence is in-
troduced in later proceedings. 
As courts are asked to consider these issues, it is reasonable to expect 
more jurisdictions will embrace the various narrowing approaches already 
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accepted by the courts in jurisdictions that have acted on these issues. This is 
the trend toward admissibility documented in Part II.308 To the extent courts 
continue this trend, the protections the rule provides become less and less 
meaningful. To the extent future courts reject these interpretations, they only 
create more complexity—circuit splits at the federal level that could require 
repeated interventions by the U.S. Supreme Court, and state splits that could 
encourage forum shopping by sophisticated multi-state actors. 
The emerging norm of interest-based legal negotiation calls upon the 
law to provide more protection, not less; yet, as has been seen, the law is 
providing less protection, not more. As this divergence between law and the 
process needs of negotiation continues to broaden and deepen, it is reasonable 
to foresee retreat on disclosure by attorneys in the trenches of individual cas-
es. Indeed, their ethical duty to zealously advocate for the best interests of 
their clients would seem to compel them to do so. 309 
Perfect storms bring great disasters, and this one would be no different. 
A worst-case scenario might look something like this: doctrinally, all states 
and the federal courts would adopt the limiting interpretations of Rule 408 
and related state laws that are now recognized by some, if not many, jurisdic-
tions. Worse yet, they would continue to draw upon the older rationales to 
develop other approaches for admitting legal negotiation evidence, given the 
invitation to permissiveness offered by the textual transition of the rule from 
one of presumptive inadmissibility to presumptive admissibility. At the end of 
the day, in the vernacular, the rule would be swallowed by its exceptions. 
Realizing settlement discussion evidence is actually more available than 
previously believed, zealous attorneys would make it a practice to consider 
how to find such evidence, either in their own cases or in other cases involv-
ing the same or, in some cases, similar parties. The vast terrain of settled cas-
es would become a hunting ground for potential evidence. 
Such a development would defeat the rule’s ultimate purpose of promot-
ing settlement. Settlement would be discouraged because, as seen from the 
rise of modern interest-based negotiation, mediation and other consensual 
settlement processes that settlement—as distinguished from triumph—
requires at least the minimal mutual satisfaction of party interests. The satis-
faction of party interests requires disclosure of the parties’ needs, concerns, 
and preferences. As Professor Susskind has reminded us many times, “You 
can’t have shared problem-solving without sharing the problem.”310 Both le-
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gal ethical rules and common sense compel the conclusion that disclosure of 
party interests in a legal negotiation requires the assurance that such disclo-
sures will not be used against the party in a subsequent legal proceeding if the 
negotiation fails. 
The natural consequences of such a development are potentially cata-
strophic. Without that assurance, there will be no disclosure; and without dis-
closure, there will be no interest-based negotiation. Without interest-based 
negotiation, there will be no problem-solving in litigation; without problem-
solving in litigation, there will be fewer settlements and more litigation. 
Such an outcome is precisely the opposite of what Congress intended 
when it enacted Rule 408. It brings us back to the future, to the mode of ad-
versarial legal negotiation that was in place when Congress enacted Rule 408 
in 1975. It is difficult to imagine a more absurd result.311 
B. Rewriting the Rule as a Full Privilege 
These structural, institutional, and doctrinal problems can be remedied 
by elevating the rule from its current status as a “quasi-privilege” to a full and 
formal privilege.312 The mediation privilege of the UMA, enacted in 2001 
with an understanding of modern negotiation and other settlement practices, 
provides a secure, politically tested, and judicially embraced model for mak-
ing this transition. The argument begins with a deeper understanding of the 
law of privilege. 
1. Privilege as a Doctrine of Evidentiary Exclusion 
At its essence, the law of evidence begins with the proposition that “the 
legal system ‘has a right to every man’s evidence.’”313 From there, centuries 
of experience have carved out many exceptions to this basic rule of admissi-
bility for many different reasons.314 
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In most cases, the exception arises because of concerns about the integri-
ty of the evidence or the proper functioning of the judicial system—
hereinafter referred to as “institutional concerns.”315 Rules of hearsay and 
relevance are common examples of these rules, which are rules of limited 
admissibility in that they allow the evidence to be received in some circum-
stances but not others.316 Under the law of hearsay, a potential heir’s testimo-
ny about what the decedent told him regarding distribution of his estate ordi-
narily would be inadmissible in a will dispute under the hearsay rule if of-
fered as proof of the potential heir’s share because of obvious concerns about 
the reliability of the proffer.317 The potential heir may be able to get the out-
of-court statement into evidence, however, to establish the decedent’s affec-
tion for him under the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule.318 
In some cases, evidence is excluded for reasons of “extrinsic social poli-
cy”—that is, a policy determination that the evidence should be excluded be-
cause it would interfere with other goals that are more important to society 
than the admission of the evidence.319 These exclusions for reasons of extrin-
sic social policy are now known as the rules of privilege, and they are very 
different than the other traditional bases for exclusion.320 
Rather than rules of limited admissibility, privileges are absolute barriers 
to admissibility: If the evidence meets the requirements of the privilege, and a 
recognized exception does not apply, the evidence is excluded.321 Thus, if the 
heir in a will dispute sought to call the deceased’s lawyer to testify about what 
the decedent told the lawyer about his share under the will, the lawyer could 
assert the attorney-client privilege as a complete bar to the testimony for any 
purpose (absent an applicable exception). 
There are other differences as well. Challenges based on institutional 
concerns about the integrity of the evidence can be raised by either party or 
even by the court on its own motion. Privileges to bar the use of evidence, 
however, can be asserted only by someone who is specifically authorized to 
assert that privilege, known as the “holder” of the privilege.322 Depending on 
the privilege, the holder may not even be a party to the suit, such as with the 
spousal privilege, which permits a non-party spouse to assert the privilege to 
block the introduction of even a highly relevant spousal communication be-
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cause of the extrinsic policy favoring the sanctity of marital communica-
tions.323 Not so with challenges based on institutional concerns about the evi-
dence. Because these challenges exist to help ferret out the truth of what hap-
pened in individual cases, rather than implement a broader social policy, they 
can only be asserted by the parties in the dispute.324 
Because of the strength of privileges as a barrier to admissibility, courts 
are generally loath to create privileges on their own, and typically construe 
privileges narrowly.325 Executive privilege provides a famous example, as the 
federal courts rejected assertions of this privilege by Presidents Richard Nix-
on and Bill Clinton in their efforts to preclude access to evidence in their re-
spective scandals.326 
Importantly, privileges further vary according to the strength or robust-
ness of their protection. Some privileges are considered “absolute” in that 
they are only subject to waiver or certain narrow, specific exceptions, and 
leave courts no discretion to receive or reject the evidence.327 Others are con-
sidered “qualified” privileges in that they permit the court to engage in judi-
cial balancing to determine if the privilege will apply to bar evidence in a par-
ticular case. Examples include the privilege for trade secrets328 and the identi-
ty of confidential informants.329 
2. Rule 408 as a “Quasi-Privilege” 
Rule 408 is a unique hybrid that includes elements of both privilege and 
exclusions based on institutional concerns. Its placement in Article IV of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence bears a Janus-like significance. Looking to the 
past, it reflects Wigmore’s historical rationale for the rule as a doctrine of rel-
evance. Looking to the future, it recognizes its deeper purpose—to promote 
the private settlement of dispute. The drafters acknowledged both rationales 
in the Advisory Committee Notes to the original 1976 rules, but, importantly, 
conceded that the “more consistently impressive ground is promotion of the 
public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.”330 
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The analogy to the mythological Janus is particularly apt. Janus was the 
Roman god of transitions, of beginnings and endings, and played a key role 
with respect to conflict and disputes.331 He is said to have opened his temple 
doors during times of war, to offer refuge to those seeking relief. So, too, 
Rule 408 offers a safe harbor for those seeking to end disputes, fostering the 
communications necessary to resolve disputes by ensuring their confidentiali-
ty. This was the primary hope and intention of its drafters. 
Yet, as this Article documents, Rule 408 is in fact far too porous to pro-
vide this safe harbor—a problem that again speaks to the Janusian quality of 
transition. Litigation was far different in 1975 than it is today, nearly a half 
century later. It was, for the most part, tightly focused on economic redistribu-
tion pursuant to an adversarial process. It was discussion about that economic 
exchange that the rule sought to shelter, and appropriately so given the nar-
row distributive focus of these talks, the disfavor with which the law views 
barriers to “every man’s evidence,” and the historic nature of the compromise 
discussion as a doctrine of relevance and limited admissibility. 
As shown, legal negotiations are far different today as they steadily 
evolve toward a more consensual, problem-solving process model in which 
the exchange of interests, concerns, and preferences can lead to the creation 
of value rather than its mere distribution, and to terms in addition to, or other 
than, the simple exchange of money.332 Apologies, changes of practices, and 
acknowledgments are just a few of the many non-monetary terms that are 
commonly found in today’s settlement agreements.333 To be sure, such con-
cessions can have economic value, but often in ways that are more specula-
tive than “the validity or amount of a dispute claim” that is the crux of Rule 
408. 
As currently drafted, contemporary settlement discussions about these 
issues simply do not come within the narrow reaches of the rule, even though 
they often constitute the bulk of legal negotiation. Worse yet, even when the 
rule does apply, its many exceptions and limitations further undermine its 
utility. 
The problems outlined in Parts II–IV suggest that the compromise hy-
brid model that made sense in 1975 no longer makes sense today, and that the 
courts cannot be counted upon to fix the problem. Just as practice has 
evolved, so, too, Rule 408 must evolve from a quasi-privilege to a full privi-
lege if our legal system is to continue to honor the primary rationale em-
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braced by the Advisory Committee—the extrinsic policy of promoting private 
settlement. 
The law does have some recent experience in making such a transition, 
and in a similar context—mediation, which like negotiation, is a consensual 
dispute resolution process dependent upon the exploration and at least mini-
mal mutual satisfactions of party interests. 
3. The Uniform Mediation Act 
The most significant recent legislative drafting effort on a rule of confi-
dentiality is the Uniform Mediation Act (“UMA”).334 The first uniform rule to 
be jointly drafted by representatives of the Uniform Law Commission 
(“ULC”) and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) in its century-long his-
tory of partnership, the UMA also provides critical guidance on how to recraft 
Rule 408 as a privilege. 
a. Background 
The UMA was enacted in 2001 after a four-and-a-half-year drafting ef-
fort that included nearly a dozen published drafts for comment, preceding as 
many public drafting sessions.335 Public participation was strong and diverse, 
including more than fifty official observers from within and beyond the law, 
and within and beyond the ADR community, as well as scores of other inter-
ested parties.336 The drafting was a difficult process, as the committees strug-
gled with many of the issues that now plague Rule 408. This makes particular 
sense given that mediation is simply a form of “facilitated negotiation.”337 
At the end of the day, however, the UMA was broadly endorsed for con-
sideration by the states, the ABA, the major ADR professional organizations, 
the significant ADR provider organizations, judges’ groups, law professors, 
and many others.338 It has been signed into law by nearly a half-dozen juris-
                                                                                                                           
 334 In the interest of full disclosure, the author served as the Reporter for the ABA drafting 
committee of the Uniform Mediation Act, and the Associate Reporter for the Uniform Law Com-
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 335 Reuben, Dust Settling, supra note 8, at 100 & n.3, 106, 111. For a history, see id. at 101–
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 336 See id. at 105. 
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dictions in the fifteen-plus years since its enactment,339 which is a good pace 
by uniform law standards.340 
Though it has been introduced in a few jurisdictions that ultimately did 
not adopt it, the reason it did not move forward dealt with political will, not 
substantive concerns about the Act. In enactment states, it has been well re-
ceived by the practicing bar and by the courts. A Westlaw search in January 
2018 revealed only fifty-two mentions of the UMA in the state cases database 
since its enactment in 2001, most of which are pro forma or approving cita-
tions.341 The most significant substantive issue appears to be what constitutes 
waiver of the mediation privilege under the Act. This issue makes sense given 
the inevitable need for courts to interpret new statutes, especially on such 
fact-driven issues as waiver.342 
The critical point here is that the UMA is a consensus document on the 
needs of the settlement process in today’s litigation environment. It was draft-
ed through a national consensual process, endorsed by the ABA through the 
national political process, embraced by the states through their legislative 
processes, and upheld by the courts that have considered it through their judi-
cial processes. Although drafting was often heated in the clash of legitimate 
interests and concerns, most if not all concerns were addressed to the point of 
consensus if not unanimity, to the point where even its harshest critics ulti-
mately urged its passage by the ULC.343 In 2003, the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law drew upon the Uniform Mediation Act 
privilege in structuring similar provisions for its 2002 Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Conciliation.344 
The second critical point goes directly to the issues confronting Rule 
408: after extensive consideration and debate over a period of years, the 
drafters rejected the Rule 408 structure as a national standard for protecting 
mediation communications against subsequent admissibility in favor of a 
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strong privilege with limited exceptions.345 More pointedly, Rule 408’s struc-
ture was not even a factor in the intense debate over how to structure the pro-
tection because of concerns over its weakness.346 Rather, it was quickly dis-
missed as drafters and commenters focused on what were perceived to be the 
two most realistic choices: a categorical rule of exclusion with no exceptions 
(akin to an absolute privilege) and the privilege approach that the drafters 
ultimately adopted.347 
b. The UMA Privilege 
Both Rule 408 and the UMA are unusual rules in the world of privilege. 
However, their quirks point in very different directions. As a quasi-privilege, 
Rule 408 includes characteristics of both privilege and institutional doctrines 
of exclusion, and, as evolved and interpreted, posits a rule of presumptive 
admissibility set in the context of limited inadmissibility.  
The UMA goes the other way in providing the strongest privilege known 
to the law. Unlike other privileges, its scope by statute extends far beyond 
judicial proceedings and applies to preclude admission of mediation commu-
nications in administrative proceedings, arbitrations, and even grand jury pro-
ceedings.348 Moreover, it is explicitly available to more holders than any other 
privilege, extending to mediators and other “nonparty participants” in the 
mediation—including witnesses and support people—as well as the parties 
themselves.349 Finally, although privileges can generally be waived expressly 
or by conduct inconsistent with the privilege, the UMA does not permit for 
waiver by conduct; any waiver must be express.350 
The drafters worked hard at clarity, pushed in part by the presence of 
non-lawyers at the table as well as a felt need to constrain judicial discretion, 
while at the same time allowing courts to do justice in individual cases within 
those constraints.351 The UMA is a communications privilege, and, unlike 
most statutory communications privileges, specifically articulates who can 
block the admissibility of mediation communications evidence—a feature 
made necessary by the presence of uncommon privilege holders, specifically 
the mediator and nonparty participants.352 
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The exceptions to the general rule of privilege are even more telling of 
the drafter’s commitment to clarity and balance. Section 6 of the UMA essen-
tially includes two classes of exceptions, which were referred to during the 
drafting as “above the line” and “below the line” exceptions.353 The Section 
6(a) exceptions do not permit judicial discretion; if they apply, there is no 
privilege and the mediation communications evidence comes in. These in-
clude situations such as the mutual agreement of the parties to admit the evi-
dence,354 evidence of crime or fraud,355 evidence of professional malprac-
tice,356 and evidence of the abuse of vulnerable parties.357 These exceptions 
were not controversial in the drafting or adoption processes, and, not surpris-
ingly, reflect several of the exceptions courts have found for Rule 408. 
The “below the line” exceptions of Section 6(b) do permit judicial dis-
cretion to admit the evidence in certain situations, such as in cases involving 
felonies or claims that the mediation agreement was fraudulently induced or 
subject to some other defect of contract formation.358 Even then, the UMA 
provides the courts with explicit guidance as to how to conduct this balance 
with a presumption of inadmissibility, stating such evidence should be admit-
ted only if the court determines: 
after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the 
proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not oth-
erwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that substan-
tially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that 
the mediation communication [evidence] is sought or offered . . . 
[for a purpose specified by statute].359 
c. Applicability to Rule 408 
Although it would take some adaptation, the UMA provides a blueprint 
for how to provide the safeguard for legal negotiations in today’s litigation 
environment that Congress intended when it enacted the rule in 1975. 
With respect to structure, the privilege structure provides stronger, more 
certain protections than the hybrid Rule 408, and this accounts for the more 
interest-based format of many legal negotiations today. It is the need to ac-
commodate the many interests, concerns, and preferences in a modern settle-
ment process that led the drafters of the UMA to explicitly reject the Rule 408 
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approach as a structure for a uniform state law to secure the confidentiality of 
mediation communications.360 Communications made in traditional legal ne-
gotiations deserve no less protection. Indeed, it is a cruel irony that mediation 
provides parties far more protection against subsequent admission than the 
negotiation process upon which mediation is based, at least in UMA states. 
Redrafting Rule 408 as a full privilege would further allow the drafters 
to clearly define and broaden the scope of the protection to include all aspects 
of the legal negotiation, not just those statements made pursuant to the value 
of disputed claims. This would include statements of apology, discussions 
about non-economic compensation, as well as settlement terms other than the 
exchange of value.361 
Redrafting Rule 408 as a full privilege like the UMA would add certain-
ty and clarity to the law by articulating limited exceptions that will inspire 
public confidence in the private settlement process. At the same time, it 
would also provide courts with critical guidance for implementing what con-
tinues to be congressional intent with respect to Rule 408. In this regard, the 
UMA’s two-part approach to exceptions is particularly instructive. Many of 
the UMA’s non-discretionary “above the line” exceptions already apply in the 
context of Rule 408, though others may be worth considering, such as the 
exception to permit evidence relating to the abuse of vulnerable parties.362 At 
the same time, the rule accommodates the need for judicial discretion in other 
situations—but, critically, provides courts with clear guidance in terms of 
how to exercise this discretion in a way that ensures fidelity to congressional 
intent.363 
To be sure, there are many issues to be considered in such a drafting 
process, and the UMA was drafted in the context of a dispute resolution pro-
cess that needed to account for considerations that are not found in traditional 
legal negotiations, such as the presence of the third party neutral. As a result, 
there will be aspects of the UMA privilege that are less applicable to the legal 
negotiation context than they are to the mediation context, such as the need to 
confer holder status on a third party neutral.364 At the same time, the thought-
fulness of the UMA process has also identified and resolved issues that may 
be worth a fresh look by a Rule 408 drafting committee. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is little question that the intent and purpose of Rule 408 and relat-
ed state laws is to promote settlement in civil cases by rendering statements 
made in such discussions inadmissible in subsequent proceedings—in effect 
providing a safe harbor for candid settlement discussions that can help courts 
operate more efficiently and effectively. 
There is also little question that settlement is better for the parties in 
many cases. It allows the parties to use that safe harbor to explore their needs 
and concerns in order to come up with a mutually satisfying resolution of 
their dispute, without fear that such disclosures will lead to exploitation by 
virtue of their admission in a court of law if the negotiation fails. This is the 
essential predicate of modern negotiation, as well as the mediation movement 
built upon that foundation. 
Close analysis of the statutory text and doctrine in the state and federal 
courts, however, demonstrates a vast gulf between these noble intentions and 
the reality of the state of the law of legal negotiation, and how it can actually 
play out in particular cases. This is a predictable outcome of a perfect storm: 
evolved statutory permissiveness on the federal side without conforming leg-
islation by the states, judicial desire to do justice by allowing parties in cases 
before them access to the evidence necessary to prove their cases, and a shift 
in negotiation practice toward greater disclosure to facilitate broader settle-
ments. 
As clear as the problem is, fixing it will be challenging. Political will 
may be the most significant issue. Though this research focuses on cases 
where the Rule 408 claim was rejected, even a cursory review of the rest of 
the Rule 408 cases suggests that courts often do apply the rule’s protections, 
probably more often than they reject the claim. Thus, the problem is some-
what obscured by the fact that it is one of potential, rather than certainty, in 
any particular case. Such a dynamic makes it difficult to develop the political 
will for change. A cataclysmic event, such as the admission of settlement dis-
cussions evidence in a high-profile case, could bring enough attention to the 
issue to galvanize a reform effort, but if and when that will happen is highly 
speculative. 
Moreover, even if the potential for admission is realized in particular 
cases, the effect of the problem is dispersed rather than concentrated. That is 
to say, there is likely to be little if any coordination among attorneys whose 
clients have been harmed by the leniency of Rule 408, leaving them frustrated 
in individual cases but unable to see the larger problem that has been present-
ed in this Article. Nor is it likely that the research herein presented will be 
replicated any time soon or that any entity will step up to provide ongoing 
monitoring of the issue. 
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Finally, change in the law is challenging even with political will. The 
need to change must be proven, as hopefully has been done here. But even 
then, the mechanics of change are difficult. In this context, for example, this 
Article has simply proposed elevating the protection for compromise negotia-
tions from a “quasi-privilege” to a full privilege and broadening the protec-
tion to apply to all aspects of legal negotiations rather than just compromise 
discussions over value. Even that, however, would require redrafting the fed-
eral rule, again, and moving its placement from Article IV to Article V of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. To some traditionalists, that alone might seem 
heretical. Then there is the matter of getting all fifty states to conform—no 
small matter, as evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of state 
rules are still based on the 1975 formulation of Rule 408, having not yet even 
caught up with the 2006 and 2011 changes. 
It is fortunate that the universe of U.S. legal institutions includes two en-
tities that can help make such a transition much easier, assuming there is the 
political will to act and to do so in a coordinated way. The first of these insti-
tutions—the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence—is the 
essential starting point. It alone has authority to recommend changes to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and its recommendations are almost always 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress for application in all feder-
al courts. 
The second of these institutions is the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws—or, as it is commonly known, the Uniform 
Law Commission. The ULC’s mission is to provide for uniform state laws in 
areas where uniformity in state laws is desirable, such as contracts and trusts. 
The ULC has already recognized the importance of uniformity on the is-
sue of mediation confidentiality, adopting a mediation privilege among other 
issues when it adopted the Uniform Mediation Act in 2001.365 Vertical and 
horizontal uniformity of confidentiality law for legal negotiations are just as 
important as mediation, if not more so, given the similarity of the dispute res-
olution processes, and the much higher prevalence of legal negotiations as 
compared to mediations. 
The experience to date with the adoption of Rule 408 in the states sug-
gests that it may be inefficient, if not counter-productive, to leave the adop-
tion of a revised federal rule to be handled on an individual state basis. The 
risk of variations rises with each state’s consideration, thereby undermining 
the goal of uniformity, and there is no assurance that all states will act at sub-
stantially the same time, if at all. 
The ULC can overcome this inefficiency by adopting the revised federal 
rule as a uniform law, perhaps with minor revisions appropriate to state 
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courts, and then sending that uniform rule to the states for adoption. Uniform 
law commissioners are said to have a “moral obligation” to help promote the 
enactment of duly adopted uniform laws in their states and to keep the final 
enactments as close as possible to proposed uniform law to assure uniformi-
ty.366 
Even with these institutions, fixing the problems that now plague Rule 
408 and related state laws will take time and effort. But the need for reform is 
there. The blueprint for reform is there. The opportunity for reform is there. 
The time to seize it is now. 
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